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DEAR READER,
You hold in your hands a new professional journal entitled Economy & Finance. 
We believe that the economy and the fi nancial sector are interdependent. Just as the 
success of one drives the other forward, so failure also drags the other down. It is 
particularly important, therefore, to publish studies and research in these two fi elds 
within a single trade journal.
Hungary’s leading associations and stakeholders with an interest in fi nance coop-
erate in the publication of this journal: the Hungarian Banking Association, the 
National Association of Entrepreneurs and Employers, the Confederation of Hun-
garian Employers and Industrialists, the Budapest Stock Exchange and the Central 
Clearing House (KELER). In this way, we can ensure a broad range of articles on the 
economy and fi nance that complement and enhance each other.
Economy & Finance will be published quarterly in Hungarian and English. Th e 
print version will be sent to the most important fi nancial, economic, scientifi c and 
political stakeholders, while subscription will be open to everyone. Issues will also 
be available for download in electronic form on the publishers’ websites.
We hope readers will fi nd the articles stimulating and interesting, and feedback will 
always be more than welcome. Th e main objective of our journal is to create a useful 
forum for practical professionals. To this end, we recognize that we must continuously 
improve, and that your help will be needed for us to achieve this goal.
 Levente Kovács Erika Marsi





Last Wednesday, fi ft h-year students majoring in fi nance at Corvinus University, 
as part of their course in Quantitative Finance, arrived at the topic of Th e Bal-
ance of Cash-Flow Relations (BCR) created by Mária Augusztinovics (Guszti). On 
Friday of the same week, Guszti passed away. Tomorrow’s seminar with students 
will be the fi rst time we analyze the mysterious operation of the monetary cred-
it system through BCR as the work of an economist who is no longer with us. 
Among Hungarian economists over a certain age who were involved to some 
degree in the current of domestic economic thinking between 1960 and 2000, 
everyone knows the name of Guszti. Th e wider public knows the name of Mária 
Augusztinovics from her works related to pension schemes, but this was not the 
only area in which she was an internationally recognized expert. Her works on 
the quantitative theory of money had a strong direct and indirect infl uence on the 
thinking of those who played a leading role in the series of fi nancial and economic 
reforms that began in the 1960s, or on those who taught fi nance at universities. 
Th rough elaborating BCR, Guszti was the fi rst to apply input-output analysis in 
the fi eld of fi nance. Together with her followers, she attempted to quantify how 
a sector generates income from another sector receiving a loan, how much credit 
is paid back by a third sector as a result of the chain of spending thus begun, 
how much money is accumulated by yet another sector, and so on. By means of 
linear algebra, these wide-reaching, repeatedly connected, infi nite multi-sector 
fi nancial chains can be arranged into easily interpretable, simple correlations. 
For example, the 1,000-forint note in my pocket may only exist in today’s credit-
based monetary system if somewhere in the economy there is a bank debt to this 
same amount of 1,000 forints as its antiparticle. In the economy as a whole, more 
money means more debt. Th e money stock increases by exactly the same amount 
as the stock of money-creating credit: 
p*1 = v*1
In a breakdown by sector, the relationship between money stock growth (p) and 
debt growth (v) is shown by:
p = < p’ > (E – K – < t’ >)–1 v,
where pj’ and tj’ show the percentage of income depositing as money stock at the 
jth sector and spent on repayment. Matrix K presents how many units of income 
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the ith money owner generates from one unit of income of the jth money owner.1 
It is surprising that the structure of correlations between monetary defi cits and 
surpluses in the economy can be embraced so concisely. We no longer encoun-
ter BCR in the Hungarian specialist literature. Today’s fi nancial PhD theses deal 
more with the milliseconds of stock exchange trading strategies. 
Augusztinovics belonged to the generation of economists who believed, or had 
the capacity to believe, that the economic situation in Hungary would be im-
proved through their ideas and calculations. At that time the goal was not merely 
to publish as much as possible in the hippest possible foreign journals in order to 
obtain an assistant professorship at some domestic faculty. Th e topic of research 
was not decided by what was trendy or easy to sell in foreign trade journals.  
Guszti’s generation believed that if we better understand the functioning of the 
specifi c economy in which we live, then the “economic mechanism” can be re-
formed in the right direction and living standards may rise. Th e activity of Hun-
garian professors of fi nance considered as pioneers in the Eastern bloc (Riesz, 
Hagelmayer, Bácskai), alongside the generation of theoretical economists hall-
marked by the trio of Augusztinovics, Bródy and Kornai, set a direction for do-
mestic thinking about money, the banking system and securities markets that 
was fundamentally diff erent to that common in the other socialist countries. 
I remember the imbroglio that ensued when, as a young assistant professor of 
Karl Marx University of Economic Sciences, Márti Sulyok-Pap presented the BCR 
theory of Augusztinovics in Bulgaria in 1978. From among the older generation of 
Russians, East Germans and Bulgarians, a few strongly attacked Márti and Au-
gusztinovics’s BCR, arguing that in socialism there are no bank notes that can be 
created merely by lending, but Marx himself already said that money was capable 
of fulfi lling monetary functions as a result of its relationship with gold. Th en in 
a break in proceedings, two young Bulgarians told us how great it was for us that 
we could teach such things. And this happened in 1978! 
Today, input-output models have almost completely disappeared from the 
teaching of economics in domestic higher education, despite the fact that the 
accreditation curriculum of the MAB (Hungarian Accreditation Committee) 
theoretically includes Sydseater and Hammond’s standard international text-
book Mathematics for Economic Analysis, which contains the Leontiev matri-
ces. Th ese are now missing from teaching in practice, however. Th ree of us tried 
to fi nd the possible reasons for this last year in our article entitled: “Where have 
the rows and columns disappeared?” With the death of Guszti, it is likely that 
1  Discussed in more detail in: Augusztinovics – Király – Száz: Where have the rows and col-
umns disappeared? (In: Matematikai közgazdaságtan,  Budapest Műszaki Kiadó)
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analyses of the operation of the economy arranged in calmly logical rows and 
columns will become even rarer. 
But what do arguments about gold and money have to do with the lives of mil-
lions of people? More than you would think. For example, the management of the 
National Bank of Hungary (MNB) purchased large quantities of cheap gold (at 
USD 200) on international markets around the end of the 1960s and early 1970s, 
whereaft er the price of gold soon leaped to USD 600-800.2  As early as 1966, MNB 
leaders (János Fekete, Miklós Pulai) conducted exploratory negotiations with the 
International Monetary Fund in London about our potential accession, in order 
to make any possible future diffi  culties with our balance of payments easier to 
surmount. It is wrong to think that all this depends solely on the decisions of poli-
ticians and their fl exibility. Just as the making of the 1969 Hungarian movie “Th e 
Witness” primarily required people who were capable of creating a fi lm of out-
standing quality and bravery which politicians were eventually forced to swallow 
sooner or later, the same also entirely applies to fi nances and economic reforms.
Th e best-known reform workshop was the Financial Research Institute headed 
by István Hagelmayer in the 1970s and 1980s. Hagelmayer gathered together a 
research team and discovered hitherto unknown young talents at the start of their 
careers, a dozen of whom would later become ministers, presidents and vice presi-
dents of the central bank, or chiefs of the State Financial Supervisory Authority: 
László Antal, Mihály Kupa, Katalin Botos, László Asztalos, Lajos Bokros, György 
Surányi, Werner Riecke, István Szalkai, István Csillag, György Matolcsy, Éva Várh-
egyi and many more. Only a few people know that the supervisor of István Hagel-
mayer’s PhD thesis was Mária Augusztinovics. 
“Finances in Socialism” by Mária Augusztinovics was published as a slender 
booklet in 1963. Its content was a crystal-clear and concise concentration of what 
we can fi nd elaborated in detail in “Money in Socialism” by Hagelmayer (1964) 
and “Money Circulation and Credit” by Riesz (1970). Th ese professional books, 
which were absolutely free of ideology, served as refreshing counterpoints to suc-
cessive tomes of the “szoc. pg.” thought of the time.3
Th e inverse matrix that shows spiraling eff ects plays a central role in Auguszti-
novics’s BCR (as is typical in I/O models). All the elements of the matrix are eco-
nomic multipliers: the original intervention multiplied equals the accumulated 
eff ect on a given point of the economy. Summarizing the elements of the matrix 
of the BCR model (E-K)-1, we see how much income is generated in all the sec
2  For decades, the price of an ounce of gold was fi xed at USD 35 for issuing banks, and the fi xed 
exchange rates of convertible currencies were also based on this from World War II until the begin-
ning of the 1970s. 
3  Szoc. pg. was a popular abbreviation of “political economics of socialism” at the time.
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tors if each sector receives one unit of credit.4 I have not the faintest idea how one 
could create an inverse matrix that would summarize the inspiring impact made 
by Guszti. 
Guszti also liked to ask fundamental questions concerning our profession dur-
ing private conversations aft er dinner. For example, long before the appearance 
of bitcoin and such, she initiated discussions on several occasions about how the 
concept and nature of money had changed as a consequence of new electronic 
methods of payment, securities trading technologies that were previously incon-
ceivable, and other new developments. Aft er her death, I have started to wonder 
how I would answer the question: “Has the world moved forward due to econo-
mists?” I would say something along the lines of: Certainly, but this discipline has 
defi nitely also caused at least two serious injuries, mainly in the hands of naïve 
amateurs. To name but two examples of thoughtlessness that occur all the time:
1. “A loss-making company or project is bad – it must be terminated, or must not 
even be started.” At fi rst glance, this is tautologically true, but if we consider exter-
nal factors, then we might incur much higher costs at other points of the economy 
by terminating such a company or project than the amount of the loss we must 
face.5 I suspect that before the accountant’s view conquered the world, our ances-
tors with their common sense approach instinctively viewed the world in a much 
more complex way, in the days when an endless series of partial analyses had not 
yet fi lled economic journals (I am guilty of a few of these myself…)
2. “Competition, the market and the ‘Invisible Hand’ will solve everything.”6 Adam 
Smith surely did not mean this to apply to situations where corruption or even 
the mafi a rules the market. But even in an ideal case, he says nothing about the 
speed of the solution beyond the tendency itself. From mathematics, however, we 
know exactly that the speed of convergence is a decisive issue. In the case of an 
approximate calculation, it certainly does matter whether it is suffi  cient to sum up 
a few members to obtain a given accuracy or whether millions of members should 
be added up. We learned in geography class that erosion carries mountains and 
fi lls up plains. A proof of this, for example, is that Heinrich Schliemann found 
eight other cities above the city of Troy before fi nding what he was looking for at 
the lowest, ninth level. Despite this, the Alps and the Carpathians are holding up 
4  Th e strongly discounted loans of the latest Growth Credit Programme of the MNB are based 
precisely on the hope that the sum of the elements of the inverse matrix is a very high fi gure, much 
higher than one.
5  A metropolitan public transport system can easily operate at a loss anywhere in the world. If a 
fi nancial balance can be attained by increasing ticket prices and cutting services, then you can take 
it for granted that the whole enterprise does not fulfi l its fundamental purpose. But no one reckons 
with this, for example because there is no available data.
6  Even the problems of healthcare or higher education…
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quite well. It seems that supply and demand do not always come together through 
love at fi rst sight – not to mention that both are always changing capriciously.
Unfortunately, I cannot now know whether Guszti would agree with my thinking.
* * *
In her calculations related to pension schemes and the BCR, Guszti examined the 
correlations between defi cits and surpluses – their interrelations through sectors, 
years and decades. But right now I can only see one big defi cit.
Guszti was a clever, cheerful, pleasant but rather angular personality. Her way of 
thinking was disciplined and reached to the core of the problem. She did not like 
confusing, ambiguous things. When I fi rst had the chance to talk and argue with 
her at length on a specifi c professional matter as a young university teacher, she 
confi dently scolded me aft er a while: “Stop saying ‘if it pleases’ me! Either address 
me in the polite form, or let’s speak on a fi rst-name basis.” She was like that. Our 
relationship of several decades would stay on a fi rst-name basis from the moment 
we shared a pear brandy together that day, although at that time it was not com-
mon for a young man to be on a fi rst-name basis with a woman almost a quarter-
century older than him – nor for a freshly appointed assistant teacher to address 
a doctor of sciences in this way.
It is November. And it keeps growing colder.
Budapest, 25 November 2014.
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In fi nancial theory, we can accept as a basic standard that the variation of prices 
over time on fi nancial markets can be described using the “random walk” principle. 
Random walk means that price movements do not follow any trend or tendency and 
past price movements are unsuitable for speculating about future price variations. 
On the other hand, there exists another paradigm that is based on the “ergodic 
axiom.” Th is claims that the probability distribution of the past and the present de-
termines the probability distribution which dictates future market price outcomes. 
In theory, the random walk hypothesis and the ergodic axiom are polar opposites. 
While the concept of uncertainty is linked closely to the fi rst, the latter asserts the 
possibility of forecasting. Empirical proof is obtainable with respect to the random 
walk hypothesis, but the ergodic axiom can be regarded as an endeavour to resolve 
uncertainty. Th e present paper examines how the theory of effi  cient markets, and 
the  effi  ciency of the market itself, provides this contradiction a means of passage.
JEL code: G10, G17
Key words: fi nancial crises, ergodic axiom, fundamental uncertainty
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS REFLECTED IN THEORETICAL 
FUNDAMENTALS
Oft en remarked upon, but seldom emphasized, is the similarity (indeed, the com-
mon origin) between the great global economic crisis and the international fi nan-
cial crisis of 2007–2009, since in both cases the main cause was the deregulated 
free fi nancial market. Regarding the causes of the latter crisis, Oxford mathemati-
cian Jerome Ravitz wrote the following in 2008:
“Yet the term ‘faith’ is believed by these competent present observers to be rele-
vant to the mathematics at the heart of the multi-dimensional pyramid game that 
has led to our present [credit crunch] catastrophe. Combined with the corrup-
tion of quality and the abuse of uncertainty in mathematical models, blind faith 
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in [classical] economics and mathematics forms the third element of the toxic 
mix that has enabled greed and irresponsibility to wreak their destructive way as 
never before. Mathematics fi rst provided an enabling technology with computers; 
then with a plausible theorem it off ered legitimation for the runaway speculation; 
and fi nally, with models of their value, risk and quality, it framed the quantitative 
specifi cations of its fantasized products. Mathematics thereby became uniquely 
toxic, what Warren Buff et has called ‘weapons of mass destruction’.”
Th is concise “charge sheet” at once directs criticism at the credit bubble that oc-
curred under loose lending conditions, the theory of effi  cient markets, risk trans-
fer based on computer models, speculation, the synthetic products of fi nancial 
markets and toxic fi nancial products. A single study is obviously too narrow a 
framework to formulate a comprehensive “plea for the defence”; however, what 
we can undertake is to construct a more nuanced picture of the crisis itself, and of 
its theoretical context. Th e fi rst strand of this four-part exposition deals with the 
role of the random walk hypothesis on fi nancial markets; the second part with the 
position of the ergodic axiom; the third part discusses market effi  ciency; and the 
fourth part analyzes the real importance of uncertainty.
Before we embark on our main train of thought, let us quote from a statement 
made during the most critical days of the global fi nancial crisis. In a hearing be-
fore Congress in 2008, Alan Greenspan admitted that he had overestimated the 
ability of free fi nancial markets to self-correct, and that he had missed spotting 
the possibility that deregulation might unleash destructive forces in the economy. 
Greenspan confessed: “I still do not fully understand why it happened, and ob-
viously to the extent that I fi gure out where it happened and why, I will change 
my views.” He stated the following: “Th is crisis, however, has turned out to be 
much broader than anything I could have imagined […] In recent decades, a vast 
risk management and pricing system has evolved, combining the best insights of 
mathematicians and fi nance experts supported by major advances in computer 
and communications technology. A Nobel Prize was awarded for the discovery of 
the [free market] pricing model that underpins much of the advance in [fi nancial] 
derivatives markets. Th is modern risk management paradigm held sway for dec-
ades. Th e whole intellectual edifi ce, however, [has] collapsed.”
RANDOM WALK AS THE BASIS FOR RISING PRICES ON 
THE SECURITIES MARKET
In what follows, we need to demonstrate why the intellectual theories behind risk 
management collapsed in this way, and then to explain which axioms ruptured 
at the foundations of this “edifi ce.” Since the middle of the 20th century, two im-
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portant questions have been awaiting an answer with respect to the behaviour of 
prices on fi nancial markets: one concerns the course that prices follow over time, 
the other the predictability of future securities prices.1
Early empirical investigations into the behaviour of prices on fi nancial mar-
kets revealed that a random walk pattern can be assigned to the path prices 
follow. Th is happens when prices change in a random way and are distributed 
independently of each other. Th is recognition was demonstrated particularly 
in the work of Maurice Kendall (1953:13) with respect to a broad range of com-
modity and stock markets.2 In modern economics, the fi rst more thorough ap-
plication of the random walk hypothesis to fi nancial markets is associated with 
Paul Samuelson (1965a); his contribution is concisely expressed in the title of his 
article, which states it can be proven that properly anticipated prices fluctuate 
randomly. In an informationally effi  cient market, price changes must be un-
forecastable if they are properly anticipated, i.e. if they fully incorporate the 
expectations and information of all market participants. In this regard, Fama 
(1970) convincingly proved that on an active market that includes many well-
informed and intelligent investors, securities will be appropriately priced and 
refl ect all available information. If a market is effi  cient, there is no information 
or method of analysis that can be expected to result in outperformance of the 
market according to an appropriate benchmark.
Th e random walk hypothesis, the theory of effi  cient markets and the pre-
dictability of fi nancial market prices were closely intertwined from the very 
beginning. Samuelson (1965a) once provided a verbal demonstration of 
random walk as the inevitable path that prices follow, and secondly a for-
malized proof of the superfl uous nature of forecasting. He stated that ran-
domness3 comes about with the active participation of many investors striv-
ing to increase their wealth. Proving unable to temper their greed, an army 
of investors aggressively swoop on even the smallest available informational 
advantage, and by acting in this way incorporate their information into 
1  Davidson (2012) believes that forecasting the future, while it may be useful as a tool of a certain 
scientifi c methodology, cannot be the end of the science itself. Even the sum total of scientifi c theo-
ries is not enough to provide the basis for preparation of precise forecasts. In the best-case scenario, 
forecasting can be regarded as a useful side-product, accessible on the basis of a given theory.
2  Kendall found that spot prices of wheat (i.e. current market prices) follow the random walk pat-
tern. In contrast, Samuelson (1965a) took the view that this is by no means the necessary outcome; 
it is easy to imagine a run of good weather resulting in favourable grain production and prices con-
sequently remaining depressed through several successive periods. Conveying the phenomenon in a 
technical sense, a serial correlation in weather may easily induce a serial correlation in grain supply 
and prices.
3  Merely as a matter of interest, it is worth noting that, unlike in economic science, some error in 
randomness almost always manifests itself in the natural and life sciences, due to the absence of a 
natural alternative.
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market prices and quickly eliminate the very profi t opportunities which pro-
voked their aggression. If this happens in an instant, as expected in the ideal-
ized world of “friction-proof” markets and cost-free trading, then prices will 
necessarily always fully refl ect all available information, and no profi t will be 
earned even from information-based trading (given that this profi t has already 
been earned). What we see here is counterintuitive and palpably contradictory: 
the more effi  cient the market, the more random the successive price changes 
generated by this market, and of all these markets the most effi  cient is the one 
on which price changes are completely random and unpredictable.
Samuelson found that prices of assets fl uctuate randomly around an optimal 
course that can be grasped mathematically. He proved that under certain con-
ditions, futures (forward) prices – in the case of raw materials – can display the 
characteristics of random walk. Samuelson’s formalized proof rests on one of 
the fundamental characteristics of conditional expectation. If we prepare fore-
casts of price behaviour in consecutive moments in time, then these forecasts 
are conditional expectations, and consequently the expectation preceding the 
next forecast is the same as today’s forecast. On intuitive examination, although 
information available tomorrow improves the forecast, it is still best if the in-
formation is already incorporated into today’s forecast. Accordingly, the best 
solution for tomorrow’s forecast today is simply today’s forecast. Samuelson 
bases his proof on the random fl uctuation of futures prices; for his part, the 
fundamental assumption is that the market renders futures prices equal with 
the conditional expectation of spot prices, with respect to the time of the fu-
tures contract.4 Samuelson proves that the expected profi t from holding a futures 
contract will be zero. Essentially, today’s forecast already incorporates the best 
solution, which will be tomorrow’s forecast, and consequently no profi t can be 
expected to be made on the price change.
If we take an impartial view of the above-presented results of Samuelson’s formal-
ized argument, then we may come to the conclusion that this proof can be more 
readily regarded as a corroboration of the theory of effi  cient fi nancial markets and 
the superfl uous nature of price forecasts on fi nancial markets than as a proof of 
the random walk paradigm. With his fi nding that futures prices are conditional 
expectations of future spot prices, Samuelson took a major step toward confi rm-
ing the theory of effi  cient fi nancial markets, although he also raised questions 
that reveal his doubts: “I have not here discussed where the basic probability dis-
tributions are supposed to come from. In whose minds are they ex ante? Is there 
any ex post validation of them? Are they supposed to belong to the market as a 
whole?” Although theoretically well-grounded answers to these questions have 
4  In theory, Samuelson connects the spatial (spot price) with the temporal (current futures pric-
es) in order to fi nd a solution for the relationship of prices: current futures prices = future spot prices.
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not really been found, what can be fi rmly stated is that both the theory of effi  cient 
markets and random walk have emerged as the paradigm of fi nancial markets in 
the past half-century. Fama (1965, 1970, 1976) accomplished much in this regard, 
combining the theoretical foundations formulated by Samuelson with empirical 
evidence.
Th e theory of effi  cient markets states that it is very diffi  cult – indeed improbable 
– to profi t from the forecasting of price movements. Th e main driver behind price 
changes is the arrival of new information. A market can be considered “effi  cient” 
when price corrections occur rapidly, when the response to new information is 
free from distortion in the ordinary sense. As a result, the current price of securi-
ties – at any point in time – refl ects all the available information. It follows from 
this that there is no reason to feel that prices are either too high or too low. Th e 
correction of securities prices occurs even before the investor has time to trade 
and earn a profi t with the assistance of a new, additional dose of information.
Th e main reason for the existence of effi  cient markets is strong competition among 
investors in the interests of profi ting from new information. Th e ability to identify 
undervalued or overvalued stocks is a very valuable skill (permitting investors to 
acquire certain stocks below their “real” value or to sell others for more than they 
are worth). Consequently, a great many investors devote a lot of time and resources 
to unearthing incorrectly priced stocks. Naturally, as more and more analysts vie 
with each other, doing their utmost to gain an advantage through overvalued or un-
dervalued stocks, the slimmer the chance that they will be able to fi nd and exploit 
such incorrectly priced securities. In a state of equilibrium, a comparatively small 
number of analysts will be able to profi t from discovering incorrectly priced stocks, 
while the majority will succeed only by chance or not at all. For the overwhelm-
ing majority of investors, gains from information analysis probably do not surpass 
transaction costs. (For more on this topic, see Clarke – Jandik – Mandelker, 2001.)
Random walk indicates that price movements do not follow any trend or pattern, 
and past price movements are unsuitable for drawing conclusions on the future 
evolution of prices. Securities markets are full of well-informed, well-paid and 
highly trained investors, who search for undervalued and overvalued securities 
depending on whether they wish to buy or sell. Th e more players on the market, 
and the more rapid the dissemination of information, the more effi  cient the mar-
ket may become.
Th e paradox of effi  cient markets is that if every investor feels a market is effi  cient, 
then it is possible this market is not effi  cient aft er all because no one is analyz-
ing the stocks therein. In reality, effi  cient markets depend on market players who 
feel that the market is ineffi  cient, and who trade in securities in order to outper-
form the market. Markets are in truth neither perfectly effi  cient nor entirely inef-
fi cient. All markets are effi  cient to a certain extent, only some more than others. 
Financial crisis, random walk, market efficiency 13
Effi  ciency cannot be demonstrated in contrasting black and white, but is instead 
characterized in shades of grey. It is on markets where effi  ciency is seriously lack-
ing that investors with greater knowledge may outperform the less well-prepared.
Th e theory of effi  cient markets and the random walk of prices on securities mar-
kets have occupied a central place for decades both in fi nancial theory and market 
practice. Nevertheless, views have also been expressed which cast doubt upon the 
temporal independence of price changes. Lo and MacKinlay (1999) contend that 
the value of the serial correlation of a share price is not zero. Accordingly, in the 
case of a given stock at a given time, a yield can be earned on share prices in the 
short term as a consequence of the movement of investors in a single direction, 
or the so-called herd eff ect. Shiller (2000) believes that this was the eff ect which 
led to the irrational exuberance of the “dot-com boom” in the mid-1990s. Fama 
(1998) asserts that investors initially either overreact or underreact to informa-
tion, and the aforementioned serial correlation is attributable to a full reaction to 
this information over time. Th e phenomenon can also be attributed to the “herd 
instinct” eff ect. Shleifer (2000) identifi ed three important arguments besides the 
theory of effi  cient markets and the random walk. First, investors are rational, and 
therefore value securities rationally. Second, some investors are irrational, but 
because their trading is random they cancel each other out. And third, although 
certain investors are irrational, rational arbitrageurs eliminate their infl uence on 
prices. If all these conditions apply, then both effi  cient markets and share prices 
are unpredictable and thus follow the random walk pattern.5
Samuelson (1965b) considered an optimal path at the centre of fl uctuation of the 
random walk, around which securities market prices fl uctuate in random man-
ner. In the theory of effi  cient markets, prices in the case of liquid assets traded on 
the market fl uctuate around the actuarial value, and the deviation of the current 
price from the actuarial value is known as “noise.” Noise is simply the weighted 
average of probabilities that all share prices may shift  in the ensuing period.
Just how big a role is played by noise in general – and by noise trading in particular 
– in prices on the securities market and the formation of random walk is convinc-
ingly demonstrated in the study on noise by Fischer Black (1986). Th e fundamen-
tal importance of this work lies in the fact that, in contrast to the implicit proof of 
Samuelson (1965a), it provides an explicit argument pertaining to the central role 
of random walk. Noise is one of the formative components of securities prices, by 
nature related to returns. Black (1986) gives an astonishing answer to the question 
5  Th e martingale improves on the random walk model. A martingale is a stochastic variable Xt 
which has the property that given the information set Ωt, there is no way an investor can use the 
information set Ωt to profi t beyond the level which is consistent with the risk inherent in the security 
(Elton et al, 2002). Th e martingale is superior to the random walk because stock prices are known 
to go through periods of high and low turbulence.
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of what really motivates noise trading. In his view, noise traders are individuals 
who trade based on something they believe to be information, but which in reality 
is merely noise. More generally, at any given time there are investors who trade 
on information for varying reasons – for example, based on unexpected liquid-
ity demand – and these investors would be willing to “overpay” for the privilege 
of being able to carry out trades immediately. It is important for us to recognize 
that noise is the opposite of information: market participants ordinarily trade by 
relying on information, and although noise promotes the functioning of fi nan-
cial markets, it is at the same time a source of confusion in the operation of the 
market.
Th e very important recognition by Black (1986) is that “both price and value will 
look roughly like geometric random walk processes with non-zero means.” Th e 
reason for the unpredictable fl uctuation of prices is that “the means [averages] 
of percentage change in price and value will change over time. Th e mean of the 
value process will change because tastes and technology and wealth change. [Th is 
mean] may well decline when value rises, and rise when value declines. Th e mean 
of the price process will change because the relation between price and value 
changes (and because the mean of the value process changes). Price will tend to 
move toward value.” Black also stresses that “the short-term volatility of price 
will be greater than the short-term volatility of value. Since noise is independent 
of information in this context, when the variance of the percentage price moves 
caused by noise is equal to the variance of the percentage price moves caused 
by information, the variance of percentage price moves from day to day will be 
roughly twice the variance of percentage value moves from day to day. Over long-
er intervals, though, the variances will converge. Because price tends to return to 
value, the variance of price several years from now will be much less than twice 
the variance of value several years from now.” 
“Volatilities will change over time,” Black continues. “Anything that changes 
the amount or character of noise trading will change the volatility of price.” (See 
Black (1986), p. 533.)
From all this, we can reach the conclusion that securities prices follow a random 
walk pattern, and that this is closely tied to the theory of effi  cient markets. Th e 
basis for this assumption is that because investors react immediately to all kinds 
of information, no profi t can be realized from information-based trading, and 
prices thus always fully refl ect the available information. Th is leads to the random 
walk hypothesis, which states that the more effi  cient the market, the more ran-
dom the successive price changes. Random walk can be defi ned in terms of price 
changes that are independent of each other in time.
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THE ERGODIC AXIOM AND THE FUTURE MOVEMENT 
OF SECURITIES PRICES
For fi nancial market players, the question of how to recognize the future evolu-
tion of prices has always been an exciting one, since instant riches await those 
who know the future prices on fi nancial markets. Th e theory of effi  cient markets 
and the random walk process examined in the foregoing provide an agnostic an-
swer to this question, entailing the unpredictable fl uctuation of prices and the 
superfl uous nature of making predictions. 
In fi nancial theory specifi cally, and in economics more broadly, another para-
digm exists based on the ergodic axiom. Th e ergodic axiom claims that the prob-
ability distribution of the past and the present determines the probability distri-
bution which dictates future market price outcomes. Accordingly, the future is 
never uncertain, but merely risky in terms of probability, although these things 
cannot technically be guaranteed. Referring to Keynes’ well-known concept of 
uncertainty (1936), the post-Keynesian Paul Davidson (1982–1983) has argued in 
his writings for decades against the applicability of the ergodic axiom. (A detailed 
discussion of the latter can be read in Davidson’s work: 2007: 30–35; 102–103; 110–
112). So how did the ergodic axiom become one of the basic principles of econom-
ics and fi nancial theory?
Ergodic theory describes the behaviour of dynamical systems when operative for 
a long period. Th is theoretical foundation holds that – under certain conditions – 
the time average of a function exists almost everywhere along the trajectory and 
is related to the space average. Birkhoff  (1931, 1942) and Neumann (1932), as well 
as Kolmogorov (1934), started from the premise that generally the time average 
and space average may diff er from each other. If, however, the transformation is 
ergodic, and the measure is invariant, then the time average is equal to the space 
average almost everywhere.6 If we take any integrable function of our space, pick 
a point in the space at random (according to the ergodic distribution), and calcu-
late the average of the function along the point’s universe (the entire population), 
then we obtain the time average. As the time extends to the infi nite, then the time 
average converges to a limit; that limit is equal to the weighted average of the 
value of the function at all points in the space (with the weights provided by the 
same probability distribution), and this is the space average. Th e classical ergodic 
theorem is one version of the law of large numbers, which states that a suffi  ciently 
6  In a dynamical system, a transformation maps a space into itself. Th e set of points we get from 
applying the transformation repeatedly to a given point is called its trajectory or orbit. Some dy-
namical systems are “measure preserving,” which means that the measure of a set is always the same 
as the measure of the set of points which map to it.
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large sample (i.e. an average over a long time) is representative of the whole popu-
lation (i.e. the space average).
If we equate the individual points of the universe with the progression of securi-
ties market prices, the averages derived from prices over the investment time ho-
rizon with the space average and time average, all the price changes over the time 
horizon with the population (universe), and the sample taken from the universe 
as a sample of the market price changes, then there was no obstacle to the ergodic 
axiom’s secu-rities market analogy. Samuelson (1969) wrote that if we hope to 
move economics from “the realm of history” into “the realm of science,” then we 
must impose the ergodic hypothesis on our theory (Samuelson, 1969: 12). In other 
words, he made the ergodic axiom the sine qua non for the scientifi c method 
in economics. Lucas and Sargent (1981) similarly claimed that the principle be-
hind the ergodic axiom is the only scientifi c method of pursuing economics. In 
their view, “the characteristics of a science require rigour, consistency and math-
ematics. So, if economics is to be a science, it must display these characteristics.” 
Samuelson additionally claimed that economists must accept the ergodic axiom 
in their models in their pursuit of economics as a science on a par with phys-
ics, astronomy and chemistry. Th e theory of effi  cient markets possesses all these 
characteristics. Samuelson, Lucas and others adopted the ergodic axiom because 
they wanted economics to enjoy the same status as the “hard sciences” such as 
physics or astronomy.7
Th e foregoing scarcely leaves any doubt that the raising of the ergodic axiom to 
the rank of paradigm might more likely be seen as an avowal of scientifi c theory 
than the reaching of any realisation resting on empirical observation, while si-
multaneously representing opposition to Keynes’ concept of uncertainty. At the 
time Keynes wrote his General Th eory (1936), he could not have known of the 
ergodic stochastic theory. Nevertheless, in his critique of Tinbergen’s economet-
ric method, Keynes (1939) noted that Tinbergen’s method is not valid for any eco-
nomic forecast as economic data are “not homogeneous” over time. Th e lack of 
homogeneity is a suffi  cient condition for non-ergodicity in processes. Th erefore, 
using post-Keynesian terminology, Keynes’ concept of uncertainty about the eco-
nomic future is based on the requirement that the economic system be controlled 
by non-ergodic stochastic processes.
Th e ergodic axiom assumes that the economic future is already predetermined, 
given that the economy is governed by an existing ergodic stochastic process. It is 
7  “For example, the science of astronomy is based on the presumption of an ergodic stochastic pro-
cess that governs the movement of all the heavenly bodies from the moment of the ‘Big Bang’ to the 
day the universe ends. Accordingly, probability analysis using past measurements of the movements 
of heavenly bodies permits astronomers to predict future solar eclipses within a few seconds of when 
they actually occur.” (Davidson, 2012)
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enough merely to calculate probability distributions regarding future prices and 
output to be able to state important and reliable statistical information about the 
future. Davidson (2009) provides a technical explanation of the diff erence between 
ergodic and non-ergodic stochastic processes. Th e ergodic axiom imposes the 
condition that the future is already predetermined by existing parameters (mar-
ket fundamentals). Consequently, the future can be reliably forecasted by analyz-
ing past and current market data to obtain the probability distribution governing 
future events. In other words, if future events are assumed to be generated by an 
ergodic stochastic process (in the language of mathematical statisticians), then the 
future is predetermined and can be discovered today by proper statistical probability 
analysis of past and present data regarding market fundamentals. If the system is 
non-ergodic, then calculated past and current probability distributions do not pro-
vide any statistically reliable estimates regarding the probability of future events.
If we perceive the economy as a stochastic process, then future outcomes are de-
termined by the probability distribution. Davidson (2012) uses a distinctive ar-
gument to refute the knowability of future data. Logically, in order for income 
generators to prepare statistically reliable forecasts of future parameters, deci-
sion-makers must draw a sample from the future for analysis. Given that this is 
impossible, the economy is assumed to be a stochastic process, permitting the 
analyst to claim that samples drawn from the past and present are equivalent to a 
sample drawn from the future. In other words, the ergodic axiom implies that the 
outcome at any future date is the statistical shadow of existing market data. Since 
drawing a sample from the future is impossible, effi  cient market theorists must 
presuppose that probabilities have been calculated from already existing market 
data, and that this is equivalent to data deriving from a sample of the market in the 
future. Th is presupposition is embodied in the ergodic axiom, which in essence 
contends that the future is merely the statistical shadow of the past. As Davidson 
says: “Only if this ergodic axiom is accepted as a universal truth will calculating 
probability distributions (risks) on the basis of historical market data be statisti-
cally equivalent to drawing and analyzing samples from the future. Only under 
the ergodic axiom is the past, the present and the future all rolled up into one!”
Th is approach contrasts sharply with the viewpoint of Keynes, who saw an eco-
nomic system proceeding through calendar time from the unalterable past to an 
uncertain, statistically unpredictable future, where individuals make decisions 
on spending their income in the awareness that they cannot know future out-
comes. If Keynes – in his own time – had known of the classical ergodic axi-
om, then he would have rejected it, since this approach specifi es that all future 
events are probably certain and that the future can be precisely known or reliably 
predicted based on analysis of existing market data. One of the relevant funda-
mental propositions of today’s neoclassical economics presumes that there are 
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large numbers of rational decision-makers on the market who, before making a 
purchase or sales decision, collect and analyze reliable information on both the 
probability of events that have already occurred and on the probability of events 
that can be expected to occur in the future. On an effi  cient market, it is assumed 
that this important information on the past and future is available to all decision-
makers. Under the profound paradigmatic infl uence of the ergodic axiom, the 
theory of rational expectations typically plays a defi ning role. Neoclassical theory 
presumes that market players have “rational expectations” regarding all future 
possible outcomes of any decision made today. Th e theory of rational expectations 
advanced by Lucas (1998) asserts that although individuals presumably make de-
cisions based on their own subjective probability distributions, if expectations are 
to be rational then these subjective distributions must be equal to the objective 
probability distributions that will govern all possible outcomes at any particular 
future date. In other words, somehow today’s rational market participants must 
possess statistically reliable information regarding the probability distribution of 
the universe of future events that may occur on any specifi c future date.
In projecting back upon Keynes’ analysis of the ergodic concept, the post-Keynesi-
an Davidson (1982–1983, 2007) presumes that the fi nancial system is not determined 
by ergodic stochastic processes. In a non-ergodic world, present or past probability 
functions are not reliable guidelines for the probability of future outcomes. If future 
outcomes cannot be reliably predicted on the basis of existing past and present data, 
then there is no actuarial basis for insurance companies to provide holders of these 
assets protection against unfavourable outcomes. Accordingly, it is not surprising 
that insurance companies have experienced billions of dollars more in losses on 
assets traded in these failing securitized markets than the companies had previ-
ously estimated (Morgenson, 2008). In a non-ergodic world, it is impossible to ac-
tuarially estimate insurance payouts in the future. Keynes and the post-Keynesians 
that followed him reject the assumption that the individual can know the economic 
future, since this is not predetermined. Instead, they assert that the individual 
“knows” that the future outcomes of critical economic decisions taken today can-
not be known. In their view, the future is truly uncertain and not just probabilisti-
cally risky. Let us now quote three more sources with respect to doubts over the 
precise knowability of the future. An article by Taylor and Shipley (2009), written 
at the time of the fi nancial crisis, has this to say on the subject of predictability:
“Probability and statistics just don’t feel right for many problems [...] Th ey give the 
impression of allowing fairly for the eventualities [...] and then something unex-
pected happens. [...] Th ose of a more pragmatic nature would want some measure 
of credibility such as the extent of applicability to a theory or a problem. In com-
plex systems, the predictability that is so successful in the controlled worlds of the 
lab and engineering has not worked and yet theories claiming predictability have 
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misled policy makers and continue to do so. [...] We may even have to own up to 
not having an appropriate model at all, surely a modern-day heresy.”
Hicks (1977: vii) makes the following observation: “One must assume that the 
people in one’s models do not know what is going to happen, and know that they 
do not know just what is going to happen.” According to Hicks, who accepted the 
framework Keynesian conditions, people under conditions of true uncertainty 
oft en recognize that they do not possess, and cannot possess, an indication of 
what constitutes rational behaviour. In Keynes’ world, for businesses and house-
holds alike, the maintenance of liquid status is of prime importance.
Davidson (2008) explains why, as long as the future is uncertain and not just 
probabilistically risky, the price that liquid assets can sell for at any future date 
in a free market can vary dramatically and almost instantaneously. In the worst-
case scenario, liquid fi nancial assets can become unsaleable as the market collaps-
es, creating toxic assets. Th is is what happened with mortgage-backed securities, 
particularly in the case of subprime mortgage derivatives.
From all this, it may appear that the random walk hypothesis and the ergodic 
axiom are polar opposites in the theoretical sense. While the concept of uncer-
tainty is linked closely to the fi rst, the latter asserts the possibility of forecasting. 
Empirical proof is obtainable with respect to the random walk hypothesis, but the 
ergodic axiom can be regarded as an endeavour to resolve uncertainty. In the fol-
lowing we examine how the theory of effi  cient markets, and the effi  ciency of the 
market itself, provides this contradiction a means of passage.
MARKET EFFICIENCY IN TIMES OF CRISIS
In the world of effi  cient fi nancial markets, holders of traded assets can in theory 
easily liquidate their positions at a price close to the previously announced market 
price whenever they hope to reduce their position with regard to a given asset. If the 
theory of effi  cient markets is applicable to today’s world, then we might ask how the 
failure of so many securitized markets can be explained, in the sense that investors 
have found themselves locked into investments from which they cannot cash out.8
8  A number of accounts attest that representatives of several investment banks told clients these 
assets were “cash equivalents” (Kim – Anand, 2008). Many holders of auction-rate securities be-
lieved that the assets they held were highly liquid, given that the market was set up by major fi nancial 
institutions such as Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch as dealers, who provided 
normal “price talk.” Th e New York Times of 15 February 2008 reported as follows: “Some well-heeled 
investors got a big jolt from Goldman Sachs this week: Goldman, the most celebrated bank on Wall 
Street, refused to let them withdraw money from investments that they had considered as safe as 
cash. […] Goldman, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch and other banks have been telling investors the 
market for these securities is frozen – and so is their cash.” (Anderson – Bajaj, 2008, p. D4).
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George Soros (2008) put forward a characteristic argument in awakening doubts 
over the prevalence of market effi  ciency. In explaining why the theory of effi  -
cient markets is not applicable to fi nancial markets in the real world, he reasoned 
using terminology a little diff erent from that of Keynes, but conceptually his 
method is the same. Soros wrote that we must abandon the prevailing theory of 
effi  cient markets as it pertains to the behaviour of the market. In his view, there 
is a direct connection between market prices and the underlying reality, which he 
calls refl exivity. What is refl exivity? Earlier (in 1997), Soros had already objected 
to Samuelson’s insistence on requiring that the ergodic axiom prevail in order 
for economics to be considered a science. Soros argued that the ergodic axiom 
does not permit “the refl exive interaction between participants’ thinking and the 
actual state of aff airs” that characterizes real-world fi nancial markets. In other 
words, the way people think about the market today can infl uence and alter the 
future path the market takes, but the fi nancial and economic future is not prede-
termined by any law of nature. Soros’s concept of refl exivity is thus equivalent to 
Keynes’ rejection (with hypothetical hindsight) of the ergodic axiom. Refl exiv-
ity means that people’s thoughts and actions shape the future, while neoclassical 
economists assume that the future is predetermined (as with the movement of 
heavenly bodies in the science of astronomy).
Aft er so much criticism of market effi  ciency as a theory, it is worth examining 
more closely the effi  ciency of the dominant globalized fi nancial markets. Today’s 
fi nancial world has a capacity for collecting and disseminating information on 
an unprecedented scale. Why should information technology have such a great 
transformational impact? Information systems can supply information on the 
state of fi nancial markets in greater detail than ever before, strengthening the 
fi nancial markets’ ability to rapidly identify abnormal profi t-making opportu-
nities, i.e. those which off er a risk-adjusted rate of return higher than normal. 
Strong buying of such assets returns prices to a normal course.
As Greenspan (2008) described it, the “intellectual edifi ce” of risk management 
is what – in his opinion – helps the investor calculate probability distributions 
pertaining to future market prices, off ering important and reliable current statis-
tical information on the future of market assets. Financial managers were advised 
to base their decisions on “risk management” computer models. Th ese complex 
models would theoretically enable investors to know with “actuarial certainty” 
the future eff ects of any portfolio decision taken today. Risk management models 
were based on a scientifi c methodology which presumed that probabilities (cal-
culated from past data) can be pooled, managed and tamed to reliably predict 
the future. Once self-interested investors have this reliable information about the 
future at their disposal, then – through their actions on free markets – they can 
optimally allocate capital resources into activities which promise the highest pos-
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sible future returns. In a world like this, markets can only be effi  cient; however, 
it turned out instead – as the crisis erupted – that these computer models are 
weapons of maths destruction. We must search deeper for the roots of effi  ciency 
problems. But before we do this, let us look at the implications for the future op-
eration of global fi nancial markets.
In the wake of deregulation and increasing innovation (with dramatically re-
duced communication costs, decreasing delivery costs and a strong stimulus 
everywhere towards cross-border securities trading), the barriers to trade and 
investment have been lowered. Greenspan (2007: 366) recalls that the dramatic 
growth that began in the early 1980s brought with it advances in technologies 
which enabled fi nancial markets to revolutionize the spreading of risk. Th ree or 
four decades earlier, fi nancial markets dealt in “plain vanilla” high-quality stocks 
and safe bonds. Financial derivatives were simple and scarce. However, with the 
arrival of 24-hour “real-time” trading on markets interlinked at the global level 
came an expansion in the market for derivatives, CDOs and other complex prod-
ucts, which are able to distribute risk across fi nancial products, both geographi-
cally and in time.
A more signifi cant fi nancial innovation appeared in the form of the credit de-
fault swap (CDS). Th is construction – classed as a derivative – is used gener-
ally in the case of a debt instrument to transfer the credit risk to a third party 
for a given price. Given that the credit transaction itself entails an appropriate 
profi t, the transfer of the default risk is favourable for banks and other fi nancial 
intermediaries, which employ strong leverage on their fi nancial balance sheets 
in order to attain an adequate rate of return on equity. At the same time, these 
same institutions – during unfavourable periods – generally also run into the 
problem of bad debt, which leads in turn to reduced lending. Long before the 
fi nancial crisis, Greenspan (2007: 371) warned of the danger that market mecha-
nisms which transfer risk away from these highly leveraged loan originators to 
other players can have a critical infl uence on economic stability, especially in a 
global environment.9
Since computers can bring together many more buyers and sellers globally than 
before, the size of the sample of market-trading participants in the computer age 
will rise dramatically. If we believe in the theory of effi  cient markets, then we can 
permit computers to organize the market, radically reducing variance and there-
fore increasing the probability of a better-organized, more orderly market – or in 
any event, a better-organized one – than existed in the pre-computer era. Th ose 
who push only for computer-based organization of the market are assuming that 
9  In this respect, the invention and arrival of the CDS on the market caused a storm. As Greens-
pan notes (2007: 371–372), the notional value of CDS agreements rose from 6 trillion dollars equiva-
lent at the end of 2004 to 20 trillion dollars by mid-2006 at the global level.
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the computer will always search out and fi nd enough participants to buy a secu-
rity whenever a large number of holders of that security want to sell. In theory, 
therefore, there can never be a shortage of participants on one side of the market 
or the other.
Financial market trading – mainly of necessity – is becomingly increasingly com-
puterized, with the “open outcry” trading of the stock exchange fl oor being re-
placed by the use of computer algorithms. Davidson (2008) justifi ably reasons 
that the holders of a market-traded asset must be sure of being able to liquidate 
their position at a market price close to the last publicly quoted price. In other 
words, fi nancial market orderliness is necessary to maintain liquidity in these 
markets. Regrettably, modern adherents of the theory of effi  cient markets believe 
that in this computer age there is no need for peculiar institutional solutions such 
as the specialist (market maker) who ensures equilibrium. In the environment of 
computers and the internet, it is implied that meetings of huge numbers of buyers 
and sellers can be handled easily and effi  ciently in virtual space. Consequently, 
these theorists believe there is no need for the human intervention of specialists 
who keep the books and also initiate trading when participants must be assured 
that the market is well-organized and orderly. Th e computer can keep the books 
on buy and sell orders, they argue, matching them in an orderly manner, more 
rapidly and cheaply than the human participants who handled these transactions 
in the past.
Davidson (2008) strenuously asserts that in a world of non-ergodic uncer-
tainty, where an orderly, liquid resale market operates, there must also be an 
equilibrium-ensuring “market maker” who assures market participants that he 
will swim against any torrent of sales orders. Th is market maker – if neces-
sary – must have access to signifi cant liquid resources, necessary because even 
the deepest reserves can be exhausted if the market maker is battling a fl ood of 
sale orders from securities holders. Liquidity can be guaranteed even under the 
severest market conditions, but only if the market maker has direct or indirect 
access to central bank resources to obtain all the funds needed to preserve fi -
nancial market orderliness.10
When markets behave rationally, as they almost always do, then market partici-
pants visibly commit themselves to accepting the “random walk,” taking the view 
10  Observations pertaining to potential illiquidity on public markets suggest that the main cause 
is the lack of a reliable market maker. In the past quarter of a century, major fi nancial underwriters 
of securities have created public markets which, through securitization, have converted long-term 
debt instruments (some of them very illiquid, such as mortgage loans) into the virtual equivalent of 
money-market funds and other short-term deposits promising high yields and high liquidity. Inves-
tors have been led to believe that they could liquidate their positions at an orderly varying price close 
to the clearing price announced at the last public auction.
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that the past gives no better indication of the probable future direction of share 
price changes than the toss of a coin. From time to time, however, this random 
walk is interrupted by panic on the market. When fear takes hold, the investor 
fl ees commitment and the share price starts to slide. But when euphoria over-
comes investors, then prices are pushed up to absurd levels. Greenspan (2007: 
177) asks how we can know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated 
asset values, which then become subject to unexpected and prolonged contrac-
tions. Generally it is said that the richest investors are those who observe people’s 
psychological shift s, rather than preparing forecasts of the expected profi ts of a 
share-issuing company. Th ose who go against the tide of investment are known as 
“contrarians.” Th ese investors trade based on the view that irrational exuberance 
will eventually cease and share prices will begin to fall; that precisely when prices 
are unjustifi ably infl ated, and when this fact has become certain, then a feeling 
of fear will grip the market and prices will return to normal. Trading against the 
mass psychological factor can be very profi table indeed in the longer term.
Humans have an innate – and seemingly permanent – propensity to swing from 
euphoria to fear and back again: generations of experience do not suggest that this 
propensity can be tempered. When we seek to answer the question of what wor-
rying imbalances and problems await on the forecast time horizon, the conven-
tional reply is that fi nancial crises that can be predicted by market participants 
occur only rarely, the reason being all-pervading uncertainty. If bulging prices 
on equity markets are perceived as a sign of market collapse, then we may know 
that investors and speculators have already tried to sell. Th is pushes the bubble 
back down and a market catastrophe can be avoided. A sudden outbreak of fear or 
euphoria is a phenomenon that no one can anticipate.11
Never in the history of fi nancial markets has global fi nancing played a part as 
comparable to today’s as it has in the past one or two decades. Th e expansion 
refl ects the opening up of international markets, and likewise the exploitation 
of advantages deriving from communication capabilities; this inspired certain 
opinion-formers to write about “the death of distance.” Entirely new forms of 
fi nancing, credit derivatives, various asset-backed securities and other syn-
thetic instruments have rendered trading on fi nancial markets more effi  cient. 
Th e progress of global fi nancial markets has appreciably improved the effi  ciency 
11  With his wealth of fi nancial market experience, Greenspan (2007: 467) states that continuously 
investing successfully is a diffi  cult task. Th e story of the most successful investors, such as Warren 
Buff ett, proves that they understood early on the well-documented anomaly that the rate of return 
on stocks – even adjusted for risk – exceeds that of risky bonds and other debt instruments, and that 
this strengthens their inclination to buy and hold on to stocks for a very long time. In one interview, 
Buff ett said that his “favourite holding period is forever.” Th e market pays a premium to the investor 
willing to endure the ordeal of watching the net worth of their investments fl uctuate beyond what is 
known on Wall Street as the “sleeping point.”
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with which accumulated savings are invested worldwide, indirectly contribut-
ing to productivity growth on a global scale. (According to Greenspan, a sig-
nifi cant portion of the world’s accumulated savings is wasted, in the sense that 
much of it fi nances unproductive capital investments, particularly in the public 
sector.) Many believe that – excluding the fi nancial market crises of the past one 
and a half decades (especially the shocking and destructive fi nancial crisis of 
2007–2009) – fi nancial markets have made a smooth transition from one state 
of equilibrium to another, meaning that Adam Smith’s invisible hand has done 
its job on a global scale.
What happens, then, if millions of securities traders worldwide endeavour to 
purchase undervalued assets or stocks, while selling those which turn out to be 
overvalued? Th is is the process which continually improves effi  ciency in directing 
limited savings toward fi nancing the most productive investments. At the same 
time, the never-ending jockeying for advantage apparent in the struggle between 
market players continuously rebalances supply and demand, accommodated at a 
pace that is too rapid for people to grasp.
Th e need to face up to realities prompts Greenspan (2007: 489) to give his opin-
ion in his memoirs, written before the onset of the latest fi nancial crisis. In his 
view, markets have become too big, complex and rapidly changing, but it with this 
market that the 20th century concept of fi nancial market supervision and regula-
tion must deal. It is no surprise that these globalized behemoths lie beyond the 
comprehension of even the most sophisticated market players. Professional opin-
ion requires fi nancial regulators to oversee a system which is signifi cantly more 
complicated than the one that existed when the regulations which still govern 
fi nancial markets today were originally framed. Given that markets have become 
too complex for eff ective human intervention, the most promising policy to ward 
against crisis may be one which maintains maximum market fl exibility – i.e. free-
dom of action for key market players such as hedge funds, private equity funds 
and investment banks. Th e elimination of ineffi  ciencies on fi nancial markets ena-
bles free markets to redress imbalances.
Th anks to their inherent potential effi  ciency, fi nancial markets enjoy the protec-
tion of free-market adherents, while on the other side critics of the theory of ef-
fi cient markets see the tightening of regulations as an eff ective means of taming 
markets. Particularly in the wake of the most recent fi nancial crisis, a clamour 
has arisen for unbridled markets to be regulated. How can unregulated global 
fi nancial processes and the inherent potential chaos be controlled if not through 
signifi cant government intervention? If daily cross-border transactions can be 
measured in trillions of dollars, of which only a few are recorded publicly, then 
how can we be sure that the unregulated global fi nancial system actually works? 
Its operation is continuous from day to day, and its operational effi  ciency largely 
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depends on the status and activity of balancing forces. Greenspan (2007: 372) uses 
the example of hedge funds to illustrate the inexpediency of tightening regula-
tion. If governments strive to rein in hedge funds, it increases the possibility that 
market liquidity will be undermined, awakening doubts over the advantages of 
other government regulation. Hedge funds change the composition of their in-
vestments so rapidly that regulators would need to scrutinize a new structure 
on an almost daily basis. Any government restriction on the fund’s investment 
behaviour would reduce the risk-taking that is an integral part of hedge funds’ 
contribution to the market.
Just how diffi  cult it is to pass judgement on the matter of fi nancial market effi  -
ciency may be confi rmed via a comparison of two opinions that are defi nitive in 
every respect. Already cited several times in the foregoing, Greenspan (2007) – a 
staunch believer in the operation of the free market – had the following to say 
about fi nancial deregulation and its eff ects:
“It is not uncommon to see legislators and regulators rush to promulgate new laws 
and rules in response to market breakdowns, and the mistakes that result oft en 
take decades to correct. I had long argued that the Glass-Steagall Act, which in 
1933 separated the business of securities underwriting from commercial bank-
ing, was based on faulty history. Testimony before Congress in 1933 was fi lled 
with anecdotes that gave the impression that inappropriate use by banks of their 
securities affi  liates was undermining overall soundness. Only aft er World War II, 
when computers made it possible to evaluate the banking system as a whole, did it 
become evident that banks with securities affi  liates had weathered the 1930s crisis 
better than those without affi  liates. A few months before I took up my duties at 
the Fed, the Board introduced a proposal that would again allow banks to sell se-
curities through affi  liates, under very restrictive conditions. Th e Board continued 
to encourage easing of the restrictions, and I testifi ed many times for legislative 
change. It took until 1999 for Glass-Steagall to be repealed by the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act. Fortunately, Gramm-Leach-Bliley, which restored sorely needed fl ex-
ibility to the fi nancial industries, is no aberration.”
By contrast, writing in Th e New York Times, Paul Krugman (2009) blamed de-
regulation of the fi nancial system, which he saw as one of the main causes of the 
fi nancial crisis:
“America emerged from the Great Depression with a tightly regulated banking 
system. Th e regulations worked: the nation was spared major fi nancial crises for 
almost four decades aft er World War II. But as the memory of the Depression 
faded, bankers began to chafe at the restrictions they faced. And politicians, 
increasingly under the infl uence of free-market ideology, showed a growing 
willingness to give bankers what they wanted. […] And the bankers – liberated 
both by legislation that removed traditional restrictions and by the hands-off  
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attitude of regulators who didn’t believe in regulation – responded by dramati-
cally loosening lending standards. Th e result was a credit boom and a mon-
strous real estate bubble, followed by the worst economic slump since the Great 
Depression.”
At the same time, we cannot omit to mention that in the opinion of Davidson 
(2008), for example, the appearance of a toxic combination of instruments is 
closely linked to the deregulation that is subject to the above contradictory as-
sessments. For him, securitization is the main cause of market degeneration. In 
times before securitization, when a bank extended credit – particularly a mort-
gage loan – the credit agreement was basically an illiquid asset, appearing on the 
asset side of the bank’s balance sheet. What value could be assigned to such an as-
set on the bank’s balance? If there was no market for such illiquid assets, then no 
indication of market value could be put on the asset. Consequently, these assets 
were generally entered on the balance sheet at the value of the issued loan, until it 
was paid off  or subject to default. Later, with the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, 
the dividing wall between commercial and investment banks was removed, lead-
ing to more and more illiquid assets being securitized, but without any credible 
fi nancial market maker. Securitization may have provided the basis for these il-
liquid assets to appear liquid, but they did not always prove to be liquid, and could 
even turn toxic when some unforeseeable event occurred. 
Th e arguments outlined above do not provide confi rmation that, in the age of 
the computer, we should harbour fundamental doubts about the validity of the 
theory of effi  cient markets, and neither do they confi rm that tightening fi nancial 
market regulations would lead to enhanced effi  ciency in the operation of fi nancial 
markets. Despite all this, we are still entitled to ask where the problem actually 
lies, and what factors can bring about a fi nancial market collapse accompanied 
by a recession in the real economy. We may attempt to answer this question by 
determining the true role that uncertainty plays on the market.
THE RE-EMERGENCE OF KEYNESIAN UNCERTAINTY
One motif running through our train of ideas is the question of how success-
fully people are able to predict outcomes on fi nancial markets. Proponents of the 
theory of effi  cient markets claim that all publicly available information that can 
induce changes in securities prices is already effi  ciently factored into the current 
price of a security by the market. For this reason, unless a given investor has ac-
cess to special or inside information not available to the market as a whole, then 
each investor will be able to anticipate price changes. In Keynes’ theory, contrary 
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to the classical theory of effi  cient markets, people recognize that the future is 
uncertain. According to Keynes, if market participants believe that the future 
is more uncertain today than it was yesterday, then they will reduce their cash-
fl ow commitments today in order to strengthen their liquidity positions. Keynes 
writes of the pervasive power of uncertainty: “Th e hypothesis of a calculable fu-
ture leads to a wrong interpretation of the principles of behaviour” (Keynes, 1937: 
122). Th erefore, the more time elapses between a choice and the appearance of 
its consequences, the more likely individuals will suspect that they must reach 
their decisions in an environment of true uncertainty. Relying on our analysis so 
far, we provide here a list of uncertainty-related arguments which investors may 
encounter:
 • A “black swan” occurrence, which indicates very rare, unexpected events.
 • Any kind of defi ciency in awareness of the external reality.
 • An occurrence with the appearance of an uncertain event, which people lack 
suffi  cient cognitive powers to correctly classify.
 • When we know little with certainty about the future payoff  outcomes of in-
vestment decisions taken today.
 • We cannot know in advance when exits from the market will escalate to mass 
proportions (interrupting circulation on the fi nancial market).
 • We cannot know when the stock market liquidity situation will become criti-
cal due to the absence of a market maker.
 • Mortgage-backed derivatives were advertised as being “good as cash,” though 
this claim turned out to be false.
 • Panic on the fi nancial market might trigger an unforeseeable cascade eff ect.
 • Th e investor can never know with certainty which liquid assets are worth 
choosing from the many available.
 • One source of uncertainty is that the rate of return realized over the lifespan 
of a fi nancial asset can only be known ex post.
 • Th e fi nancial future is also uncertain because it is not predetermined by any 
natural law.
 • Another source of uncertainty is when the investor(s) is/are afraid of unfa-
vourable events taking place.
 • Securitization leads to a huge amount of uncertainty in the fi nancial system 
because it is built on illiquid assets.
 • Investment packages created from illiquid assets can become toxic, making 
uncertainty a destructive element.
 • It can never be known in advance that a debtor might suddenly be unable to 
fulfi l their repayment obligations.
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 • Investors could not have known ahead of time that there was no well-organ-
ized, orderly functioning market for securitized assets.
 • Th e theory of liquidity preference presumes that the economic future is un-
certain.
 • One source of uncertainty can be that the market maker’s higher level of li-
quidity can “dry up.”
 • Uncertainty is increased if computers are unable to fi nd a suffi  cient number 
of buyers.
 • Can it be known in advance what price investment banks will off er at the pre-
liminary price talk before the market opens?
 • Did investors know that the major market actors do not put money on a fl ota-
tion which people are talking about?
 • Can investors know when the big fi nancial moguls might declare the market 
for a given security to be frozen?
 • Do investors know that securities deriving from transactions on private fi nan-
cial markets are traditionally illiquid assets?
 • Were investors aware that certain players have created public markets for 
long-term illiquid debt instruments?
 • Were investors warned that a given market (on which they are present) is not 
regulated?
 • Does the investor know that following securitization, certain investors create a 
public market for assets which originally came into being on private markets?
 • One source of uncertainty is that dramatic changes can occur – even in a sin-
gle moment – in the prices of assets traded on fi nancial markets.
 • It can never be known with total certainty if a market – or the investments 
circulated thereon – is overvalued or undervalued.
 • Can it be known that hedge funds eventually become unmanageably overval-
ued and their pulling power decreases?
 • Uncertainty can be reduced by using hedge funds to eliminate abnormally 
high profi t spread on the market.
 • Credit default swaps transfer the credit risk, which may nevertheless lead to 
the accumulation of bad debt.
 • Hedge funds are at once risk-bearing and hazardous – and yet the tightening 
of regulation here would reduce market liquidity.
 • Can investors have predicted that one day markets hitherto trading only in 
high-quality stocks would eventually buy and sell all kinds of assets indis-
criminately?
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 • Uncertainty is intensifi ed when there are increasing numbers of noise traders 
among fi nancial market investors, and increasingly few market players who 
rely on information and forecasts.
 • An ever-increasing proportion of investors are holders of securities who com-
mit only in the very short term, leading to the spread of “short-termism” and 
intensifying uncertainty on the fi nancial market.
Almost without exception, the scenarios listed above provide examples of fun-
damental uncertainty. Th eir main characteristic is that they are qualitative in 
nature, and can be expressed in numbers only to a very small extent, if at all. 
Contrary to the opinion of Ravitz (2008) quoted in the introduction, the fi nan-
cial crisis has neither disproven the theory of effi  cient markets, nor verifi ed the 
unsuitability of risk management models. Th e train of ideas in this study was 
assembled in an attempt to prove that we must search deeper for the causes of de-
structive fi nancial crises. What we can state is that the consequences of the crisis 
have once again set neoclassical notions of fi nancial markets at sharp loggerheads 
with the Keynesian and post-Keynesian approaches. While the former interprets 
fi nancial market events in the context of rational expectations → ergodic stochas-
tic processes → predictability, the latter places fi nancial market processes within 
the connected system of random walk → non-ergodic stochastic processes → fun-
damental uncertainty.
Th e random walk hypothesis is amply supported by empirical proof, and the 
view that prices and rates of return at consecutive points of time are unpre-
dictable is widely accepted, as is the conclusion that these series of values are 
not correlated in time in the vast majority of cases. Th is explains why the non-
ergodic stochastic progression of these series of values in time is closely linked 
to the random walk hypothesis. From this, it directly follows that not only can 
the future be seen as risky, but we must also count on the appearance of fun-
damental uncertainty at any moment. Th ere are few observations to be drawn 
from the operation of fi nancial markets that would suggest that prices behave 
in an ergodic manner. We can more readily view the ergodic axiom as the dec-
laration of a scientifi c paradigm embodying a high degree of abstraction than 
as a basic principle proven by empirical facts as they relate to the operation of 
fi nancial markets.
Th e fi nancial crisis did not disprove the theory of effi  cient markets, but magnifi ed 
and illuminated its weak points. Th e lack of equilibrium-ensuring market mak-
ers, the extremes of investor behaviour and the unrealistically large proportion of 
noise traders all suggest that market effi  ciency has been greatly infl uenced by the 
behaviour of market participants. Th e information asymmetry among players on 
fi nancial markets of the past 15–20 years, the infl uence on decisions of the moral 
hazard eff ect, and the swelling of confl icts of interest in the case of one defi ning 
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institution or another (credit rating agencies, investment banks), has taken on 
such huge proportions that uncertainty can no longer be managed. Risk manage-
ment models are surely suitable for transferring, spreading and rapidly reducing 
risk, but they have proven powerless against fundamental uncertainty. Ultimately 
we may reach the conclusion that the problem is not with predictability, but with 
the failure to reckon with uncertainty – or with the actions of fi nancial market 
players heightening that uncertainty.
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THE FINANCIAL STABILITY AND ACCESS 
TO FINANCING OF SMES IN HUNGARY 
Annamária Ónodi Kazai 
ABSTRACT
Th e present study was prepared within the framework of cooperation between 
the Competitiveness Research Centre, operating within the Institute of Business 
Economics of Corvinus University of Budapest, and the National Association of 
Entrepreneurs, based on a commission from the latter. Th e goal of the study was 
to survey the self-fi nancing capabilities and borrowing opportunities of majority 
Hungarian-owned small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and to identify 
potential problems. Th e results of the research revealed that the high proportion 
of owner’s equity in the fi nancing structure is not due to diffi  culties with borrow-
ing, but because enterprises that cover their fi nancing primarily from their own 
resources have other fi nancing opportunities at their disposal. Although general 
satisfaction with banks shows a diminishing tendency, it can still be interpreted 
favourably. Th e majority of companies have not encountered serious borrowing 
diffi  culties. With regard to the system of competitive tenders, company managers 
have sensed some improvement, but general satisfaction is still lacking. Although 
the research results suggest that the primary obstacle to growth in 2013 was not 
the lack of credit or external funding, it is important to emphasize that start-ups, 
young enterprises and micro-enterprises, which struggle the most with fi nancing 
worries, were not represented in the analysed database. 
JEL code: G2 and G3 
Keywords: corporate fi nance, capital structure, banking services, borrowing, ten-
dering system
INTRODUCTION
Th e present study was prepared within the framework of cooperation between 
the Competitiveness Research Centre, operating within the Institute of Business 
Economics of Corvinus University of Budapest, and the National Association of 
Entrepreneurs, based on a commission from the latter. We sought answers to the 
questions of what characterizes the fi nancing structure of the Hungarian SME 
sector; what are its self-fi nancing capabilities; what are the available borrowing 
or EU funding opportunities; and what problems are experienced by domestic 
enterprises in the area of capitalization and fi nancing. Th e basis for our research 
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was the 2013 corporate competitiveness research database, the fi ft h element of 
the Competitiveness Research Centre’s “In Global Competition” research pro-
gramme series. Th e survey was carried out between May and November 2013, 
with the cooperation of staff  from the TÁRKI institute for social research.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
In examining the fi nancing structure and capitalization of enterprises, it is 
particularly important for us to be clear about the characteristics of the circle 
of companies under examination. In the 2013 corporate competitiveness survey 
that serves as the basis for our research, incorporated companies employing more 
than 50 people and operating for at least four years were sought, ensuring a repre-
sentative sample in terms of both size and geographical distribution. Th e sample 
of 300 companies was dominated by medium-sized enterprises (72.7%), while the 
proportion of large companies was 16.7%. Th e majority of companies (45%) oper-
ated in the processing industry, but commerce (20%), construction, other servic-
es, agriculture and the food industry were also represented. Most of the compa-
nies were domestically owned (71.3%), while the proportion of state-owned fi rms 
was 5.7%, and the proportion of those in foreign ownership 23%. (For a detailed 
description of the sample, see Chikán – Czakó – Wimmer, 2014.)
Our investigation focused on SMEs in majority domestic ownership. Th e propor-
tion of majority domestic-owned small enterprises within the sample as a whole 
was below 10% (29 companies), while more than half of the companies in the 
sample (170 companies) were domestically owned medium-sized enterprises. Our 
population for the purposes of this study, therefore, was 199 companies. Th e will-
ingness to provide answers to the various questions in the questionnaire varied 
between 100% and 18% (in the case of borrowing goals). It follows from this that 
we were able to draw conclusions from samples of varying size for each of the 
groups of questions. Th e average number of employees in the examined sample 
was 81. Less than half of the companies were engaged in export activity, while 24% 
revealed an export intensity of above 50%.
In order to conduct a more nuanced analysis of capital structure, credit practices 
and banking relations, we applied a cluster analysis to classify the companies in 
three groups based on capital structure and frequency of borrowing, thereby per-
mitting – among other things – a comparison of domestic-owned SMEs fi nanced 
primarily from owner’s equity with those characterized by frequent borrowing.
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THE FINANCING STRUCTURE OF ENTERPRISES
Examining the fi nancing and liabilities structure of enterprises, we observed 
that within the sample, some 46.7% of majority domestic-owned small and me-
dium-sized enterprises (SMEs) never or only rarely took advantage of bank loans. 
Frequent borrowing characterized 36% of the companies (see Table 1). Th ese fi nd-
ings are in keeping with the 2009 Monitoring Report laying the foundations for 
SMEs’ strategy, which states that enterprises fi nance their developments primar-
ily from their own resources, and secondarily from bank loans. Between 2000 
and 2005, some 20–25% of enterprises held credit, refl ecting increasingly active 
borrowing in the SME sector aft er 2000, which was subsequently halted by the 
impact of the 2009 economic crisis (see Gál 2013, Ganczer 2010, Monitoring Re-
port 2009). Th e borrowing activity of the Hungarian SME sector falls short of the 
European Union average (see Monitoring Report 2009).
Table 1
Frequency of borrowing by majority domestic-owned SMEs in 2013
  No. %
Never (1) 41 32.0
Rarely (2) 19 14.8
To a moderate degree (3) 22 17.2
Frequently (4) 16 12.5
Very frequently (5) 30 23.4
Total 128 100.0
Source: Competitiveness database
For a more detailed analysis of the liabilities structure, we carried out a clus-
ter analysis, in which we relied on both 2012 fi nancial data and the frequency 
of borrowing according to enterprises’ own self-assessments. As a fi rst step, we 
established indebtedness categories based on balance sheet data. We listed com-
panies in six groups based on whether they had long-term liabilities or short-term 
outstanding loans as of 31 December 2012, as well as on the proportion of owner’s 
equity within their total liabilities. Table 2 contains the average data of fi nancial 
indicators of those companies, which proved satisfactory at a preliminary fi nan-
cial reliability examination (the assets / liabilities equation), or which did not have 
negative equity. Within the sample as a whole, fi ve companies had negative eq-
uity, representing less than 3% of the sample.
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At 44% of the examined companies, the proportion of long-term external liabili-
ties was signifi cant (14.28%), alongside the ratio of short-term credit (15.56%). 
(See Table 2, indebtedness category 6.) Th is is partly in keeping with the results of 
the 2003 survey by Sinkovics, who revealed a 13% proportion of long-term credit 
at small enterprises and a 36% ratio of short-term loans based on analysis of 2002 
balance sheet data. At medium-sized enterprises, his calculations showed that the 
proportion of long-term liabilities was 72%, while the ratio of short-term loans 
was 23%. Based on our investigation, in the most indebted company category the 
average proportion of owner’s equity was 35.8%, which is below the 2002 average 
41% ratio showed by Sinkovics. Although the companies belonging to category 5 
had long-term external liabilities, the average proportion of owner’s equity was 
75%. A high proportion of owner’s equity also characterized companies falling 
into indebtedness categories 1 (79.8%) and 3 (77.67%). Companies in category 1 
had neither long-term liabilities nor short-term credit, while the proportion of 
accounts payable to suppliers was below 6%. Although enterprises falling into cat-
egory 3 held short-term credit, its ratio did not reach 6% on average. Overall 41% 
of the examined companies had a ratio of owner’s equity to total liabilities higher 
than 75% (categories 1, 3 and 5). Th e liabilities structure of enterprises belonging 
to categories 2 and 4 was not unequivocal based on the supplied fi nancial data, 
the calculated indicators showing a low proportion of owner’s equity (32–33%). 
In category 2, besides owner’s equity, fi nancing derived mainly from accounts 
payable, while in category 4 both accounts payable (24.8%) and short-term credit 
(20%) played a strong role in fi nancing. Th e obtained results are comparable with 
the results of Gál’s 2013 cluster analysis. In the latter survey, the proportion of 
companies fi nanced almost exclusively from owner’s equity was 27%, which ap-
proximately tallies with the proportion of 24.5% for the fi rst two categories in the 
classifi cation employed by us.
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Table 2
Financing structure of domestic SMEs broken down by indebtedness 




















































































































n= (25) 16.34% 79.82% 0.00% 0.00% 5.77%
n= (11) 7.19% 33.71% 0.00% 0.00% 19.80%
n= (7) 4.58% 77.67% 0.00% 5.73% 6.92%
n= (11) 7.19% 32.35% 0.00% 20.05% 24.83%
n= (31) 20.26% 75.23% 3.74% 4.18% 6.61%
n = (68) 44.44% 35.81% 14.28% 15.56% 13.91%
Total
n = (153) 100.00% 52.50% 7.11% 11.06% 11.99%
Th e formation of clusters took place based on the indebtedness categories pre-
sented above and the frequency of borrowing by enterprises (see Table 1), thus 
identifying three principle groups (see cluster sample sizes in Table 3). Th e fi rst 
group contained companies essentially fi nancing from their own resources. In 
2012, the average proportion of self-fi nancing at these companies was 70%, with 
no long-term liabilities based on 2012 balance sheets and a ratio of short-term 
credit of 2.3% (see Table 4). More than half of these companies (51.5%) did not 
take out loans at all and 15% only rarely, while some 30% typically borrowed to a 
moderate degree (see Table 5). In the other two clusters, the proportion of owner’s 
equity was below 50%, the ratio of long-term liabilities 8–9%, and the proportion 
of short-term credit 12–16%. Despite the fact that the fi nancing structure of the 
two clusters of companies appears similar based on fi nancial data, there is a sig-
nifi cant diff erence in their frequency of borrowing. Based on self-assessments in 
the second cluster, borrowing is relatively rare, while all companies in the third 
cluster declared that they had oft en made use of credit. (For detailed data, see 
Tables 3, 4 and 5.)
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Table 3
Sample sizes and proportions of fi nancing structure clusters within 




sample as a whole
Frequency among 
domestic SMEs
No. % No. %
Dominance of owner’s 
equity 52 29.5% 33 27.70%
External fi nancing pre-
sent, borrowing rare 67 38.1% 44 37%
External fi nancing pre-
sent, borrowing frequent 57 32.4% 42 35.30%
Total 176 100% 119 100%
Table 4
Characteristics of fi nancing structure clusters among domestic SMEs 



























70.5% 0.0% 2.3% 10.9%
External fi nancing 
present, borrowing 
rare (n=38)
45.8% 9.4% 16.8% 14.5%
External fi nancing 
present, borrowing 
frequent (n=35)
48.6% 8.3% 12.1% 11.5%
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Table 5
Frequency of borrowing among domestic 

























































  No. % No. % No. %
Never (1) 17 51.5% 21 47.7% 0 0.0%
Rarely (2) 5 15.2% 12 27.3% 0 0.0%
To a moderate degree (3) 10 30.3% 11 25.0% 0 0.0%
Frequently (4) 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 15 35.7%
Very frequently (5) 1 3.0% 0 0.0% 27 64.3%
Total 33 100.0% 44 100.0% 42 100.0%
Beyond analyzing the 2012 fi nancial data, we were able – based on the assessments 
of company managers – to fashion a comparative picture of the 2013 corporate 
fi nancing structure which corroborated the earlier fi ndings. At companies pri-
marily fi nancing from owner’s equity, the proportion of external resources was 
around 20%, while the ratio of short-term resources was the lowest (17%), within 
which the most signifi cant element was the stock of accounts payable. Th e pro-
portion of external resources was highest (35.47%) within the group characterized 
by frequent borrowing, as was the ratio of short-term resources (44%), within 
which the two most decisive elements were short-term bank loans (42%) and the 
stock of accounts payable (30%).
To gain a closer understanding of companies’ fi nancing policy, it helps to examine 
the priorities of their fi nancial strategy. Company managers were asked to evalu-
ate 11 possible fi nancial priorities based on how much these characterized their 
own corporate practice. Th e most striking diff erence was that the maintenance 
of liquidity was the most important consideration in the fi nancial strategies of 
companies which borrow frequently, preceding profi tability in second place. 
In the other two clusters, the most important priority was to reduce costs. In 
the case of companies primarily fi nancing from owner’s equity, this was followed 
by the observance of payment commitments and deadlines; while in the case of 
companies borrowing only rarely, profi tability came second, but the maintenance 
of liquidity did not even feature among the fi ve most important priorities. Fac-
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tors that potentially contribute to the liquidity problems of frequently borrowing 
companies – in their own assessment – are their weaker self-fi nancing capabilities 
and profi tability below the industry average. By contrast, companies which did 
not borrow frequently assessed their profi tability at around or above average. In 
his 2013 survey, Gál likewise determined that higher profi tability was paired with 
a higher ratio of owner’s equity.
CREDIT PRACTICES AND BANKING RELATIONS
Among the examined companies, on average more than half of the credit taken 
out (55%) was in the form of short-term forint loans, followed by a proportion of 
long-term forint loans of above 40%. Credit provided by owners was seen to the 
greatest extent (30%) at companies primarily fi nancing from owner’s equity, while 
the lowest proportion in this regard (9.9%) was observed at regularly borrowing 
companies. Companies fi nancing from owner’s equity did not take out foreign 
currency credit, the proportion of which was highest at companies borrowing 
only rarely (25.9%). 
Among majority domestic-owned SMEs, the most common goal of borrowing 
was to purchase machinery, equipment and vehicles. Th e same can be said of 
companies characterized by frequent borrowing, where typically there was almost 
no settlement of bank debts or purchase of real estate. Of companies primarily 
fi nancing from their own resources, only four companies answered this question 
(4%), and for these companies – besides the purchase of machinery, equipment 
and vehicles – the purchase of materials and payment of tax debts featured with 
close to the same frequency (see Table 6).
Generally speaking, the managers of domestic-owned SMEs did not perceive 
borrowing as a signifi cant problem. Loans of less than a year’s maturity were 
easier to access than long-term credit (statistical tests corroborating the diff er-
ence). Some 22% of companies felt it was diffi  cult to take out loans of less than one 
year, while this ratio was 27% for loans of more than one year. Some 40% of the 
SMEs questioned reported no problems either borrowing for less than one year or 
for more than one year (see Table 7).
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Table 6
Borrowing goals





















Purchase of machinery, 
equipment and vehicles 3.17 3.50 2.31 3.82
Purchase of real estate 1.83 2.25 1.46 1.64
Purchase of materials 2.61 3.50 2.38 2.30
Wage payments 1.94 2.50 1.62 2.20
Payment of debts 
to suppliers 2.09 2.00 1.69 2.55
Payment of bank debts 1.97 2.75 1.54 1.80
Payment of tax debts 2.00 3.25 1.54 2.20
On a 5-grade Likert scale – 1: did not occur at all, 5: was very frequent
Table 7
Access to credit – opinions of the domestic-owned SME sector
  Loans of up to one year
Loans of more than one 
year
  No. % No. %
Unable to access loan 8 6.5 13 10.7
Diffi  cult to access loan 20 16.3 20 16.5
Moderately diffi  cult 43 35.0 39 32.2
Easy access to loan 24 19.5 26 21.5
Very easy access 28 22.8 23 19.0
Total 123 100.0 121 100.0
ANNAMÁRIA ÓNODI KAZAI42
Regular borrowers found securing loans the easiest, while those fi nancing pri-
marily from owner’s equity found it moderately diffi  cult. Th is means that a high 
proportion of owner’s equity at a company cannot be attributed to borrowing dif-
fi culties, but may rather be explained by the fact that such companies have other 
fi nancing options at their disposal and are not obliged to take out credit.
Th e obtained results are in keeping with the 2009 Monitoring Report, where 
– among other things – participants were questioned about factors hindering 
growth. In 2009, companies saw high tax and social security burdens, the unpre-
dictability of economic regulations, insuffi  cient demand and intense competition 
as the factors most hindering growth. On a scale of 100, they rated insuffi  cient 
capital at 31 and a shortage of credit at 15, compared to a value of 76 assigned 
to high taxes, for example (see Monitoring Report 2009). A 2006 survey by the 
European Commission also revealed no serious fi nancing problems, with 86% of 
companies declaring themselves satisfi ed with their fi nancing situation (cited by 
Ganczer T., 2010). We can thus assume that in 2013, it is not a lack of credit which 
has primarily hindered the growth of Hungary’s SME sector. 
Despite the fact that accessing loans is not a serious problem for the majority of 
SMEs, opportunities for accessing credit were seen as deteriorating compared to the 
years preceding the crisis. Overall, no statistically signifi cant diff erence was ap-
parent in the assessment of short or long-term loans. Less than 15% of companies 
sensed improving tendencies, while the majority (43–47%) experienced no change 
in borrowing opportunities and more than 40% saw deteriorating tendencies (see 
Table 8). Examining the question according to fi nancing structure clusters, the 
situation gives even greater pause for thought.  On the one hand, the average 
opinion in all the clusters indicated a deteriorating tendency, while on the other 
hand frequent borrowers – as the companies with the greatest amount of experi-
ence of taking out credit – gave the most negative assessment of the direction of 
change. In this cluster of companies, we experienced a statistically signifi cant dif-
ference with regard to the diffi  culty of accessing short or long-term loans. In the 
case of long-term credit, the change was seen as even more unfavourable. Th ese 
deteriorating borrowing opportunities are corroborated by several other studies. 
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Table 8
Changes in opportunities for accessing credit compared to the pre-crisis 
period – opinions of the domestic-owned SME sector
  Loans of up to one year
Loans of more than one 
year
  No. % No. %
Signifi cantly 
deteriorated 16 12.8 14 11.8
Deteriorated 38 30.4 36 30.3
No change 54 43.2 56 47.1
Improved 13 10.4 8 6.7
Signifi cantly 
improved 4 3.2 5 4.2
Total 125 100.0 119 100.0
Despite the assessment of companies that borrowing opportunities have deterio-
rated compared to the pre-crisis situation, the general level of satisfaction with 
banks can still be seen as favourable. Th is is also apparent in the fact that the ma-
jority of enterprises said they do not intend to change their bank. Th e likelihood of 
changing banks was greatest at companies that borrow frequently, 21% of whom 
regarded this as conceivable in future. 
Some 75% of majority domestic-owned SMEs had accounts at a single bank, this 
proportion being even higher (83%) in the case of companies primarily fi nancing 
from their own resources. However, among frequent borrowers this fi gure was 
only 59% (in this cluster, 29% of companies had accounts at two banks, and 8% 
at three banks). Th e majority of companies had relationships with two or three 
banks. Frequently borrowing companies had dealings with signifi cantly more 
banks (2.28) than those primarily fi nancing from owner’s equity (1.74).  (See de-
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Companies gave a favourable assessment of cooperation with their most important 
bank (a grade of 4 on a 5-grade scale). No statistically signifi cant diff erence could 
be shown between the general assessments of frequent borrowers and companies 
primarily fi nancing from owner’s equity; however, diff erences could be observed 
regarding individual elements of the banking relationship. In general, companies 
evaluated the fl ow of obligatory or requested information the most favourably 
(grade above 4). While frequent borrowers felt that the fl ow of information from 
their company to the bank was stronger (4.61 compared to 4.16), companies 
primarily fi nancing from equity regarded the bank’s supply of information more 
favourably (3.91 in the case of voluntary supply of information) than frequent 
borrowers (3.55). Th e least favourable assessments were given for notifi cation of 
changes in the fi nancial environment (3.46) and the solving of problems beyond 
obligatory tasks (3.49), but even in these two cases we can speak of neutral rather 
than negative assessments. A comparison of banking assessments also confi rms 
the earlier conclusion that the reason companies primarily fi nancing from equity 
do not generally take out bank loans is not that they would not be granted them, 
or that they have a bad opinion of banks, but rather because they have diff erent 
fi nancing policies. It is important to add to this conclusion that, as a basic principle 
in conducting research into competitiveness, incorporated companies employing 
more than 50 people and operating for at least four years were sought in forming 
the sample. 
In the case of more than 70% of companies in the examined sample of domestic-
owned SMEs, there was no request to reschedule loan repayments or interest 
payments, nor any payment default. Frequent requests for rescheduling arose at 
only 12% of the companies borrowing most frequently, while no companies did 
so in the other two clusters. Companies regarded default on payment as even 
less typical. Around 20% of frequent borrowers declared that default on loan 
repayments or interest payments was moderate, while – in their own assessment 
– this was not typical at all of 78% of these companies. (See Tables 10 and 11.)
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Table 10
























Never 71.1% 69.2% 70.8% 75.6%
Rarely 11.1% 7.7% 12.5% 12.2%
Moderate 10.0% 23.1% 16.7% 0.0%
Frequent 7.8% 0.0% 0.0% 12.2%
Very frequent 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Table 11
























Never 77.2% 92.9% 79.2% 78.0%
Rarely 8.7% 0.0% 20.8% 2.4%
Moderate 12.0% 7.1% 0.0% 19.5%
Frequent 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Very frequent 2.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
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COMPETITIVE TENDERS
Of the surveyed domestic-owned SMEs, 65% did not take part in any tenders at all 
between 2009 and 2013. Th e greatest number of companies participated in tenders 
within the framework of the New Széchenyi Plan, followed in popularity by the New 
Hungary Rural Development Programme and support programmes fi nanced purely 
from domestic sources (ministries, local governments, foundations). (Th e values in 
Table 12 must be treated with caution as the proportion of those responding to ques-
tions related to tenders was 51%. In the case of tenders, the distribution ratios were 
determined in proportion to the number of companies fi lling out the questionnaire, 
but in assigning values to all the tenders we presumed that companies not fi lling out 
the questionnaire had not taken part in any tenders at all.) However, a comparative 
evaluation of the tenders concerned provides us with a relatively reliable picture. Th e 
companies’ own assessments are in harmony with the actual frequency of participa-
tion in tenders. In terms of improving the competitiveness of companies, the New 
Széchenyi Plan was regarded as the most important, followed by the New Hungary 
Rural Development Programme and support programmes fi nanced purely from do-
mestic sources (ministries, local governments, foundations). (See Table 13.)  
Some 43% of questioned companies sought help in writing applications for all tenders, 
while 35% had no help at all. On average companies worked with a collaborating part-
ner in a little more than half of tenders (53.2%). More than half of respondent com-
panies (54.4%) proved successful in all their tenders, while the proportion of those 
whose tender participation was always unsuccessful was less than 10%. Some 61.4% 
of enterprises declared their intention to participate in various tenders in future. 
Overall companies regarded tenders as useful in terms of improving their com-
petitiveness. Th e greatest number agreed with the contention that without sup-
port through tenders they would not have been able to implement investments in 
an economical manner. Th e fi nancing from tender funds of investments already 
decided upon earlier was typically more prevalent than the initiation of new in-
vestments in response to tender opportunities. Th e assessment of company man-
agers was that investments realized through tender funding enhanced their com-
pany’s competitiveness, although they did not see tenders contribute to increasing 
the number of employees. (See Table 14.)
Approximately half the companies not taking part in tenders gave their reasons 
for non-participation. Th e primary reason for not participating in tenders (48%) 
was that they had no need for additional funding. Some 22% of companies did not 
have enough information about the tender conditions, 35% regarded the process 
as too complicated, and 25% did not satisfy the tender conditions.
Despite the fact that companies have sensed a small improvement in the tender-
ing system in the last fi ve years, complete satisfaction is still lacking. Company 
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managers agreed only moderately that the tendering system focuses on the right 
areas and groups of companies, at the same time still sensing problems with the 
transparency of the system. (See Table 15.)
Table 12
Frequency of participation in tenders
  Number of tenders
Tenders 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 or more
New Széchenyi Plan (n=84) 47.6% 22.6% 9.5% 8.3% 4.8% 3.6% 0.0%
New Hungary Rural Develop-
ment Programme (n=78) 61.5% 20.5% 9.0% 5.1% 2.6% 0.0% 1.3%
Support provided from EU 
funds through individual 
government decisions (n=62)
88.7% 6.5% 3.2% 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0%
Other tenders co-fi nanced 
by EU (n=70) 75.7% 10.0% 7.1% 4.3% 0.0% 1.4% 1.4%
Other foreign-fi nanced ten-
ders (n=57) 94.7% 1.8% 1.8% 0.0% 0.0% 1.8% 0.0%
Support programmes fi nanced 
purely from domestic sources 
(ministries, local govern-
ments, foundations) (n=65)
72.3% 15.4% 4.6% 3.1% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5%
All tenders (n=199) 65.8% 9.5% 8.0% 3.5% 3.0% 4.0% 6.0%
Table 13
Tenders seen as most important in terms of competitiveness 
(opinions of majority domestic-owned SMEs)
  No. %
New Széchenyi Plan 24 38.10%
New Hungary Rural Development Programme 15 23.80%
Support programmes fi nanced purely from domestic 
sources (ministries, local governments, foundations) 13 20.60%
Other tenders co-fi nanced by EU 9 14.30%
Support provided from EU funds through individual 
government decisions 2 3.20%
Other foreign-fi nanced tenders 0 0.00%
Total 63 100.00%
The financial stability and access to financing of SMEs in Hungary 49
Table 14
Impact of tenders on operation of companies
  Mean No. Standard deviation
Tenders created a signifi cant source of fi nancing 
for investments already decided upon earlier. 3.57 76 1.389
Tender opportunities motivated our company to 
carry out new investments, which we would not 
have otherwise initiated due to a lack of capital. 
3.54 76 1.418
Developments and investments realized 
through tender funding enhanced our com-
pany’s competitiveness. 
3.65 78 1.375
Developments and investments implemented 
through tenders could not have been carried out 
in an economical manner without the support 
thus obtained.
3.78 76 1.282
Th e number of employees has increased signifi -
cantly in the wake of investments realized with 
the help of tenders. 
2.75 77 1.339
On a 5-grade Likert scale – 1: do not agree at all, 5: agree entirely
Table 15
Assessment of tendering system
  Mean No. Standard deviation
Th e tendering system is transparent and pub-
lic, and the results in keeping with evaluation 
criteria. 
2.92 115 1.125
Th e transparency of the tendering system has 
much improved in the last fi ve years. 3.12 116 1.12
Th e tendering system focuses on the right areas 
and groups of companies. 3.09 114 1.052
Th e goals of the tendering system and its power 
to boost the economy have much improved in 
the last fi ve years. 
3.20 115 1.053
Our company can gain access to tender fund-
ing more easily than our most important 
competitors. 
2.18 119 2.049
On a 5-grade Likert scale – 1: do not agree at all, 5: agree entirely
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SUMMARY
During our research we have gained a relatively positive picture of the fi nancing 
situation of enterprises. At the same time, we must be aware that start-ups, young 
enterprises and micro-enterprises, which struggle the most with fi nancing wor-
ries, were not represented in the analysed database. 
Overall borrowing activity remains below the European Union average, but not 
due to diffi  culties in taking out loans. Th e majority of enterprises have had no 
problem borrowing, although they have sensed deteriorating opportunities to ac-
cess credit compared to the period before the crisis. It has proven harder to access 
long-term credit than loans of less than a year’s maturity – or enterprises have 
experienced less favourable tendencies in this regard. 
Th e most common goal of borrowing was to purchase machinery, equipment and 
vehicles.  Even among companies which typically borrow frequently, the settle-
ment of debts was not a characteristic borrowing goal, although the picture is 
clouded by the fact that for these enterprises one of the most important fi nancial 
goals has been to preserve liquidity, while their profi tability does not reach the 
industry average.
In keeping with earlier results, the general level of satisfaction with banks is still 
favourable, as also apparent in the fact that most companies do not intend to 
change their bank.
Our investigation corroborated the results of earlier research showing that higher 
profi tability went hand in hand with a higher ratio of owner’s equity. Our research 
results suggest that a high ratio of owner’s equity in a fi nancing structure does not 
conceal diffi  culties with borrowing, but rather the availability of other fi nancing 
options for enterprises that fi nance themselves primarily from their own resourc-
es, so that they are not obliged to borrow. 
Our presumption is that a lack of credit or external funding was not a primary 
obstacle to growth among the examined companies in 2013.
Of the surveyed domestic-owned SMEs, 65% did not take part in any tenders at 
all between 2009 and 2013. Th e greatest number participated in tenders within 
the framework of the New Széchenyi Plan, and these tenders were regarded as the 
most important in terms of improving competitiveness. Some 54% of respond-
ent companies were successful in all their tenders, while the proportion of those 
whose tender participation was always unsuccessful was less than 10%. In around 
half of all tenders, companies sought help from a collaborating partner in writ-
ing applications. Although companies have sensed a small improvement in the 
tendering system in the last fi ve years, general satisfaction is still lacking, with 
problems experienced primarily with regard to the transparency of tenders.
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Since the current government came to power in 2010, the goals of “rescuing for-
eign currency debtors”1 and “holding unfair banks to account” have been high 
on the political agenda (probably not independently from the devaluation of the 
forint in the same period). However, this battle has not produced a comprehen-
sive outcome to date, as neither early debt repayments nor the exchange rate cap 
proved miracle cures. Following several attempts and high-sounding promises, 
in the last year doubts have emerged, such as: “Why should forex debtors end up 
better off  than those who borrowed in forints?” or “Why should citizens who took 
out loans receive greater support than those who endeavoured to do without?” 
Interestingly – and in an unprecedented way – the government began citing legal 
problems, taking the standpoint that no further measures were possible on its 
part until Hungary’s supreme court, the Curia, had adopted a position on issues 
relating to foreign currency loans. From this point on, enormous pressure was 
brought to bear on the Curia to reach a so-called “uniformity decision” to ensure 
uniform application of the law as soon as possible.
It should be noted that there was nothing compelling the Curia to reach any 
such decision. Th e Curia is a court of record in the sense that it rules primar-
ily on individual cases; with each individual decision, it settles the given le-
gal dispute on the one hand, while on the other hand providing guidance to 
the lower courts. Besides this, the Curia also serves to ensure that the courts 
pursue uniform practices by making uniformity decisions pertaining to mat-
ters of principle, which are binding on the lower courts. Th e Curia will make 
such a decision if it discerns an inconsistency in judicial practice on some 
matter related to a specifi c case coming before it. However, no foreign curren-
cy loan lawsuits have yet come before the Curia – with the exception of the 
well-known Kásler case, in which the subject of the dispute was the legality 
of application of the exchange rate margin – and for this reason the necessi-
ty of issuing a uniformity decision did not strictly even arise in this regard. 
Despite this, the Curia saw the writing on the wall and adopted its decision 
no. 6/2013 PJE last December. Th is decision truly established an unequivo-
cal position with regard to several fundamental questions of so-called for-
1  See Levente Kovács: Th e Fundamentals of Lending in Foreign Currency. Hitelintézeti
Szemle (2013:3).
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eign currency-based loans, while also dispelling a number of misconceptions 
that were motivated partly by political, partly by individual interests, and which 
exploited the opportunities presented by meagre public knowledge of fi nance 
and law. Consequently, the Curia declared that a foreign currency-based loan is 
basically a forex loan, because the obligations of both the lender and the debtor 
are expressed in foreign currency; the fact that the actual disbursement and 
repayment of the loan is made in Hungarian forints does not change the con-
tent and nature of the transaction. Th is is a valid transaction in keeping with 
Hungarian law which inevitably entails an exchange rate risk – theoretically for 
both parties. A transaction of this kind is not in itself unlawful or unfair, and is 
neither usurious nor misleading. Th e Curia added that, while it is naturally nec-
essary for the contracting parties to be fully aware of the content of the transac-
tion, and particularly important that consumers receive adequate information 
regarding the risks the transaction entails, such information need not extend 
to the actual size of the risk as no such prognosis can realistically be provided.
At the time this uniformity decision was reached, the Court of Justice of the Eu-
ropean Union (EU Court) was in the process of reaching its preliminary ruling 
in the Kásler case. Mindful of this, the Curia indicated that it would return to is-
sues regarding the perceived unfairness of certain conditions of foreign currency 
loans only aft er the EU Court had reached its decision. Th e latter needed to adopt 
a position in the Kásler case on questions related to the alleged unfairness of the 
exchange rate margin. Th is question arose because Hungarian law pertaining to 
unfairness in contractual conditions is based on EU regulations, where “unfair-
ness” is a special concept in the legal sense which is not applicable to every clause 
of a contract. Regulations pertaining to unfairness essentially govern terms of 
a contract that are subsidiary to its essential content (i.e. the “small print”), to 
which the parties – and particularly the non-professional consumer – do not at-
tach great weight. For this reason, they are typically included in a contract without 
any detailed negotiation, oft en revealed to the contracting party as an unexpected 
surprise at the most awkward moment as they discover that the contract places 
this or that obligation upon them, or denies them this or that right. By contrast, 
as a general rule, unfairness cannot enter into the equation when it comes to the 
terms that comprise the essential content of the contract and the substance of the 
business agreement between the parties, terms which also determine the object 
of the service provided and the fee to be paid for that service. A fundamental 
condition for the conclusion of a contract is that the parties should actually reach 
an agreement on such substantive terms, and as a consequence of contractual 
freedom – barring certain exceptional cases – it is not the task of the law to review 
the parties’ agreement or its essential business content. With these considerations 
in mind, the EU Court adopted the position in the Kásler case that the clause 
relating to the exchange rate margin should not be qualifi ed as unfair in itself, but 
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primarily only in the event that its formulation is unclear, or if its operation in 
practice and fi nancial impact is not transparent to the consumer.
In the wake of the EU Court’s ruling, the Curia adopted its decision no. 2/2014 PJE 
extraordinarily quickly, which dealt with the following three issues: fi rst, it con-
fi rmed that the foreign exchange risk does not render the contract unfair unless the 
customer is unaware of the existence of such risk; second, it invalidated the clause 
relating to the exchange rate margin in foreign currency-based loans; and third, it 
set the requirements to which clauses governing the unilateral amendment of con-
tracts must conform. 
It is my fi rm belief that the Curia adopted a hasty and erroneous stance on questions 
relating to the foreign exchange margin and the unilateral amendment. Th e court 
based its invalidation of the clause pertaining to the exchange rate margin on the 
conclusion – albeit correct in itself – that no actual exchange occurs in the case of 
foreign currency-based loans, and for this reason the value of the service that the 
exchange rate margin represents is neither clear nor comprehensible. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Curia delivered an unacceptably broad interpreta-
tion of the EU Court’s stated requirement pertaining to the clarity and transpar-
ency of the clause in question. Clauses relating to the exchange rate margin are 
generally unequivocal in contracts, increasing the cost of borrowing for the cus-
tomer by a precisely determinable degree. Moreover, in the vast majority of cases 
the exchange rate margin is based on objective market data which are entirely in 
the public domain and applied uniformly by the lending banks to all their custom-
ers. Th e Curia evaluated the clause in question on the basis of the sole proviso that 
no actual money exchange occurs, but neglected to examine whether there is any 
element of the lending service – or any cost incurred in connection with it – which 
justifi es the application of this “charge.” It also failed to take into account that the 
exchange rate margin is an element of the counter-value of the service provided by 
the lender, the removal of which can upset the balance in the value of the entire ser-
vice and the consideration paid for it. Ultimately, by examining the justifi cation for 
one element of the value of the service, thereby overriding the business agreement 
between the parties and erasing a charge which is clearly specifi ed in the contract 
and of which every customer was aware, the Curia committed precisely what the 
regulations governing unfair clauses prohibits. 
In framing the requirements relating to the contractual clause enabling unilateral 
amendment of a contract, the Curia likewise rendered the EU Court’s requirements 
absolute. It prescribed requirements pertaining to the unilateral amendment of a 
contract which, in content, the EU Court had specifi cally formulated with respect to 
the exchange rate margin. Th e mechanical extension of clearly interpretable, appro-
priate requirements relating to the exchange rate margin to clauses enabling uni-
lateral amendment of a contract essentially makes the enforcement of such – other-
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wise legally recognized – clauses impossible. With respect to both the exchange rate 
margin and the unilateral amendment, the upshot of the Curia’s adopted stance is 
that the practice pursued for years by all banks collectively and uniformly, known 
to all and approved by the competent supervisory bodies, now qualifi es as unlaw-
ful, and the relevant contractual clauses are rendered null and void. Th e Curia also 
disregarded the fact that the issues in question – particularly the unilateral amend-
ment of contracts – were governed by specifi c legal provisions; that the clauses now 
rendered invalid actually conformed to these laws, and that every interested party 
proceeded in the knowledge that their course of action was legal. An overwriting 
on this scale of such commonly used contracts is in no way reconcilable with the 
principle of legal certainty.
In its fi rst uniformity decision, the Curia thus explicitly rejected eff orts to legally 
denounce foreign currency-based lending as a whole. In its second decision, how-
ever, it invalidated two fundamental contractual clauses pertaining to the pricing 
of loans. 
In this way, foreign currency-based loans themselves did not prove legally unten-
able, thereby freeing both legal authorities and politicians from the question – dif-
fi cult to manage from both the legal and practical aspect alike – of what to do in the 
event of a contract becoming invalid in its entirety. Th e government thus escaped 
from the trap it itself created by asserting the invalidity of foreign currency-based 
loans as a contract type. At the same time, the Curia’s second decision provided 
substantial assistance to political endeavours by specifying that a more favourable 
rate of exchange must be applied retroactively for debtors, while hikes in interest 
and charges must be taken as if they had never happened. 
In the wake of the second Curia decision, Act XXXVIII of 2014 – passed via an 
urgent procedure which, though extraordinary, has become increasingly the norm 
in recent years – essentially granted the court’s decision statutory force, declaring 
null and void the contractual clauses pertaining to the exchange rate margin and 
unilateral amendment. Th is so-called “act of invalidity” thereby led to a further 
deterioration in the situation created by the Curia’s second decision, because, while 
previously there was still hope that the Curia’s errors could be remedied via indi-
vidual lawsuits and the competent courts could take circumstances into account 
which the Curia had not considered, this option was eff ectively terminated pursu-
ant to the act of invalidity. 
Also aggravating the situation was the act of invalidity’s retroactive redraft ing of 
the statute of limitations in the Civil Code, extending its power to cases where out-
standing claims would otherwise have already lapsed. With regard to unilateral 
contractual amendments, the act of invalidity seemingly provided banks with the 
opportunity to preserve the relevant clauses since the act only declared them in-
valid based on a legal presumption, and the banks applying these clauses could 
fi le suit in order to overturn this presumption. However, the act determined spe-
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cifi c deadlines and procedural rules for any such lawsuit which render successful 
litigation an illusion. Th ese special rules are of grave concern from a constitutional 
viewpoint as they infringe on the right to due process and the independence of the 
judiciary, fundamental elements of a state governed by the rule of law.
Is there a reason for a separate debt relief act?
One constitutional concern arising in connection with the act of invalidity was 
that it held out the prospect of a separate act being passed some time in the au-
tumn governing debt relief obligations arising from the invalidation of the clauses 
in question. It follows from this that the banks had to decide on initiating lawsuits 
without being able to know exactly what consequences would result from the in-
validity established by the act. Adding to the uncertainty was the issuing by the 
National Bank (MNB) of a directive which, based on an “unorthodox” interpre-
tation of the law, would result in losses for the banks exceeding all expectations. 
Subsequently, Act XL of 2014 (the “debt relief act”) was duly passed earlier than 
expected in September. Neither the debt relief act itself nor the Bill containing the 
preamble to the legislation off er any explanation as to why the law declaring in-
validity needed to be separated from that determining the method of debt relief. 
One can only surmise that the legislation was split in two due to political consid-
erations, or in order to speed up the process. Obviously more time was needed 
to draw up detailed rules for the debt relief procedure than to declare the clauses 
null and void initially. However, even now we have still not reached the end of the 
regulatory process as the debt relief act further empowers the MNB to determine 
rules with respect to numerous matters of detail.
As a jurist, the analogy of the declaratory and obligatory judgement inevitably 
springs to mind. It is a basic principle that a petition, or statement of claim, to 
initiate a civil action must contain an explicit request seeking a judgement which 
actually determines the rights and obligations of the parties. Th e plaintiff  must 
declare what they are seeking from the defendant, and generally it is not possible 
to initiate a lawsuit which by itself merely resolves some legal question. Th e goal of 
the court procedure is to settle an actual legal dispute, and it is only in exception-
ally justifi ed cases precisely circumscribed by law that an opportunity exists to 
submit a petition which is aimed not at imposing an obligation on the defendant 
but merely at establishing a fact or legal state of aff airs. 
Th is strict, closed system was breached some years ago by an amendment to the 
law which – clearly with foreign currency loans primarily in mind – made it pos-
sible to request that the invalidity of a contract be established in itself, without 
determining the legal consequences. Th is amendment triggered wanton litiga-
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tion, and an unprecedented proliferation of forex loan lawsuits as a consequence. 
Numerous judgements were reached in which the court determined the invalidity 
of some clause of a contract without ruling on the legal consequences thereof. 
Th e parties thus eff ectively made little progress, and only at the censured bank in 
question would serious questions be raised about how the given decision aff ected 
its situation, its portfolio of loans and related revenues and obligations. A similar 
degree of uncertainty was created due to the separation in time of the act declar-
ing invalidity from the regulations determining the relevant legal consequences. 
At the same time, the interesting aspect of the situation is that the debt relief act 
precludes the use of the option introduced by the aforementioned legal amend-
ment in the case of foreign currency loans, prohibiting petitions aimed exclusive-
ly at establishing invalidity; moreover, it extends this prohibition to procedures 
already under way, ordering these to be discontinued (§37).
Th e law’s retroactive eff ect
As already mentioned, one of the fundamental problems with the act of invalid-
ity is that it annuls a set of contractual terms which were commonly applied and 
believed valid by all concerned parties at the time the contracts were concluded. 
At the same time, likewise with retroactive eff ect, it alters the rules pertaining to 
the term of limitation and the procedure for enforcing rights. Th e debt relief act, 
just like the act of invalidity, is a piece of legislation with retroactive eff ect, since it 
defi nes rules for contractual relationships established before it entered into force, 
and – as we discussed above in relation to the prohibition on declaratory petitions 
– alters standard rules pertaining to procedures already in progress. In an entirely 
unprecedented fashion, the debt relief act puts into practice a qualifi ed instance of 
retroactive legislation by generally extending the debt relief obligation prescribed 
in the act to contracts that have been previously subject to legally binding court 
decisions (§6). Th e law’s preamble declares as a natural matter of course that the 
law “does not respect judgements already reached,” but overwrites the content of 
those judgements; it does not deem it necessary to provide any meaningful jus-
tifi cation or explanation for the legality of this – or, given that this task seemed 
impossible to complete, has not even made any attempt to do so (preamble at-
tached to §6).
In light of its retroactive eff ect, a fundamental question of the act is whether it 
eff ectively only codifi es the existing law or actually amends it. To put it another 
way, the question is whether, even in the absence of the act, the same or diff er-
ent rules should be applied in settling debts with customers. In essence, this is 
what determines whether the prohibition on retroactive legislation, one of the 
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fundamental prerequisites of constitutionality, is breached in content as well. Th e 
preamble to the law off ers a contradictory response to this question.
“Th e Bill regulates the rules for settling debts with consumers in harmony with 
the Civil Code.” (General preamble, point 4.) “Th e Bill lays down the general rules 
for settling debts which the court would apply in individual lawsuits based on an 
interpretation of the Civil Code.” (General preamble, point 5.) Th e earnestness of 
these declared objectives, though obviously aimed at conforming to the require-
ment of constitutionality, is called into question by the preamble itself.
Such doubt is primarily raised by the statement that “for the settlement of past 
overpayments of this nature, there is currently neither a valid binding uniform-
ity decision nor an individual court ruling expressly settling this matter. For this 
reason, the legislator […] needed to determine the general principles for settling 
debts through a more abstract interpretation of the law.” (General preamble, point 
5.) According to the legislator, therefore, there is no established legal practice in this 
matter, so that the law eff ectively precedes the clarifi cation of the legal situation, 
deciding by means of codifi cation how to proceed in such cases. Th is is one possible 
procedure looking to the future; however, in the case of settlement with retroactive 
eff ect, it inevitably raises the possibility – or risk – that instead of codifying a law 
that is already prevailing, a new law is being created, thereby altering the previous 
legal situation. While the courts state what is law in circumstances deemed normal 
from the point of view of constitutionality, meaning that the courts decide what 
rules are applied in answering a given question or resolving a legal debate, the leg-
islator – in creating this act – has now removed the matter from the hands of the 
courts. And this, once again, is problematic because settlement takes place not with 
respect to the future, but to existing contractual relationships. With regard to the 
future, the legislator can create rules that endorse their own political preferences, 
and the parties must enter contracts – and fulfi l contractual and other obligations 
– in knowledge and consideration of these rules. In a state governed by the rule of 
law, the legislator has no power to legally adjudicate on existing contractual rela-
tionships, as establishing the content of the law governing a given legal relationship 
falls within the sole remit of the courts. Courts must operate independently of the 
government and of politics in general, acting exclusively on the basis of laws gov-
erning contracts and the relevant established legal practice. Retroactive legislation 
breaches this division of powers, allowing the legislator access to an area they have 
no business entering in a constitutional state.
Th ough not touching on the principle of the matter, it is very doubtful whether there 
is any truth to the preamble’s assertion that there is no established legal practice on 
the issue to be regulated. What are we actually talking about here? Pursuant to the 
act of invalidity, the clauses of loan contracts pertaining to the exchange rate mar-
gin and the unilateral amendment of contracts are null and void; as a consequence, 
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we must proceed as if the contracts never contained these clauses from the outset; it 
follows that the parties violated the terms of their contracts when they fulfi lled their 
payment obligations by heeding these invalid clauses (both in disbursing and pay-
ing off  the loans). Due to this performance breaching the terms of the contract, the 
act states that “overpayments occurred to the credit of consumers” (General pream-
ble, point 1); accordingly, “one of the main goals of the Bill is to settle overpayments 
occurring to the credit of consumers due to invalid contractual terms” (General 
preamble, point 5). It is not clear what is so extraordinary about this to necessitate 
an abstract interpretation of the law, as quoted above. It is easily understood that it 
is no rare occurrence when the parties – either knowingly or inadvertently – fail to 
correctly fulfi l the terms of the contract, and it may also easily occur that an over-
payment appears to the credit of one or other party as a result. A signifi cant number 
of legal disputes in civil law are precisely about drawing the legal conclusions from 
failure to fulfi l the terms of a contract and settling accounts between the parties 
accordingly. It is scarcely credible that, with a more thorough examination based 
on legal practice in cases of breach of contract, it would not be possible to adopt an 
unequivocal position on the matters to be regulated here. What is more credible is 
that by claiming legal uncertainty the legislator wished to give themselves greater 
scope to determine the rules for settling debts to their own liking. Th is, however, 
is diffi  cult to reconcile with the legislator’s objective – if indeed it really was their 
objective – that the act should not amend, but only codify the existing law.
Th is supposition is supported by the declaration in the preamble itself that: “Giv-
en that this methodology of calculation is the most favourable for debtors, then it 
is this which must be set down in law. An important consideration from the point 
of view of legal policy is that the legislator should choose the calculation method 
most favourable to the consumer.” (General preamble, point 6.) With this the leg-
islator makes two assertions: fi rst, that the legal situation is not clear-cut, meaning 
that an unequivocal outcome cannot be reached purely via an interpretation of 
the laws and legal practice; and second, that in the position of choice arising from 
this legal uncertainty, the interests of debtors are regarded as of prime impor-
tance and the rules for settling debts are formulated accordingly. Th e upshot of all 
this is that the legislator’s true goal – having paid polite lip service to the principle 
of constitutionality – is to determine a set of rules which are as favourable as pos-
sible to debtors. From a political point of view, this could be a legitimate goal of 
legislation; however, only if this legislation, in keeping with normal rules defi ning 
spheres of authority, is aimed at the future. In the case of retroactive regulation, 
the enforcing of political goals to the detriment of legal considerations inevitably 
leads to a violation of the requirements of a state governed by the rule of law.
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Settling overpayments
According to the most important regulation of the act from the point of view of 
civil substantive law, the amount to be paid to debtors must be calculated as if 
the overpayments were originally made as early repayments (paragraph (2) of §5). 
Based on what was discussed in general in the preceding paragraph, the question 
can eff ectively be put thus: In the absence of special regulations in the debt relief 
act, would this really be the method of settling debts to be applied on the basis of 
Hungarian law? In other words, in deciding on the legal dispute brought before 
it, would a court proceed according to this rule? Naturally no one can say what 
ruling a court would reach in any given lawsuit (and for this reason it is certainly 
problematic if the legislator assumes the constitutional role of the court); never-
theless, it is possible to scrutinize how reasonable the legislator’s position is in this 
regard, and how much doubt can be cast over the standpoint represented by the 
act. Th e signifi cance of the matter is that the more questionable the validity of the 
position enshrined in the act, the greater the doubt over whether the act conforms 
to the requirements of a constitutional state.
What do we mean by early repayment? Early repayment occurs when a debtor fulfi ls 
their obligation before it actually falls due (paragraph (2), §282 of the old Civil Code; 
§6:36 of the new Civil Code). It follows from this defi nition that early repayment is 
a conscious and intentional action by the debtor. Both the consciousness and intent 
of the debtor must extend to providing the given service – in our case payment – 
as a fulfi lment of their debt, and also to the awareness that they are not obliged to 
honour it before the due time specifi ed in the contract. Early repayment does not 
occur, for example, if a debtor accidentally leaves his wallet at his creditor; or if, 
before travelling or due to a sudden outbreak of fi re at home, he takes his money to 
his neighbour for safe-keeping, to whom he otherwise has an outstanding debt only 
due to be paid later; or if, of his two creditors, he accidentally transfers money to the 
one to whom his debt has not yet fallen due. In the same way, we cannot talk of early 
repayment in the event that the debtor pays in the belief that he owes a due debt of 
the given amount. Th e intentional nature of early repayment is clearly confi rmed by 
the above-cited provision of the old Civil Code, which expressly makes the option 
of early repayment dependent on the consent of the entitled party, as well as by the 
aforementioned provision of the new Civil Code, which speaks of payment being 
both off ered and accepted. In keeping with this, general practice holds that loan 
contracts permit early repayment on condition that the debtor informs the credi-
tor of their intention in advance; such a statement of intent eff ectively amends the 
provision of the contract specifying the maturity of the debt, and from this point 
on the date indicated in the statement is the new due date for repayment of the debt.
In cases regulated by the debt relief act, what happens is that the debtor has ful-
fi lled his payment obligation according to the clause of the contract becoming 
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void on the basis of the act of invalidity. To the best of his knowledge, the debtor 
has thus fulfi lled his contractual obligation, while the creditor has accepted the 
payment by the same token. Subsequently, pursuant to the act of invalidity, and 
based on an interpretation of the contract in keeping with this act, it turns out 
that the debtor has paid more than he actually needed to pay. Obviously the 
surplus payment has occurred under a misapprehension (the debtor believing 
that this was the amount of his due debt), and not with the intention of pay-
ing off  the debt before maturity. Th e creators of the law are also fully aware of 
this fact, referring not to the actual, but rather to the hypothetical intent of the 
debtor. “It corresponds to the [debtor’s] presumed intent if this overpayment is 
rendered as [a repayment of] the principal” (General preamble, point 6). If this 
is truly the most favourable option for the debtor, then it can also be assumed 
that the debtor would now like to settle the amount of overpayment in this way. 
What the debtor wants now, however, is not relevant – or at least would surely 
not be relevant to a lawsuit brought before a court – precisely because he will 
always be inclined towards the solution most benefi cial to him. Th e sole relevant 
question is what the debtor’s intention was when he made the payment. It is 
clear that the debtor wanted nothing more than to fulfi l his due payment obli-
gation. If he had known that he owed less, then he would have paid less, and if 
he had become aware aft er completing the payment that he had overpaid, then 
in most cases it is highly likely that he would have reclaimed the surplus. Th e 
surplus here is nothing other than an erroneous payment. Th e majority of debt-
ors obviously wanted to take advantage of the available borrowing opportunity, 
and only wanted to repay as much as they absolutely had to. Whoever wished to 
make early repayment of their debt would not have been repaying the amount 
of the overpayment arising from the voiding of the aforementioned clauses, but 
instead a diff erent amount which was as much as appeared possible and ad-
vantageous in light of their prevailing fi nancial situation. Viewed realistically, 
there is no basis to the supposition in the preamble to the debt relief act that 
debtors, if aware of an overpayment, would have intended to have this rendered 
to their accounts as an early repayment.
It appears that the legislator, too, was uncertain on this matter. In one place it 
states that “overpayment must be rendered as an early repayment of the princi-
pal,” and it is irrelevant that the early repayment was unintentional since “vol-
untary early repayment cannot even occur here” (General preamble, point 6). 
Elsewhere it states that the law “chose a more subtle solution […] not prescrib-
ing the use of the early repayment construction, since in this institutionalized 
form it would genuinely have no requisite legal basis, but instead the creation of 
a legal situation for the consumer at the time of settling the debt which implies 
that the overpayments were made as early repayments at the time they occurred” 
(preamble attached to §5). In other words: It isn’t like this, but we’ll carry on as if 
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it were anyway. Here there is no word of legal considerations; the Bill openly ac-
knowledges that the conditions for being able to verify early repayment are not in 
place, but despite this – for political considerations – it decides that it will resolve 
the contractual relationship as if the debtor had actually made early repayment 
of their debt: “Th e essence of settlement by early debt repayment is that the gains 
deriving from the earlier favourable exchange rate should benefi t the debtors” 
(General preamble, point 6). Aft er this, the only remaining question is on what 
basis did the preamble as quoted above state that the act determines rules which 
a court would also apply in the conduct of a lawsuit. If they do so at all, courts 
exercise great caution in applying any analogy similar to that described in the act, 
and certainly not in order to maximize the benefi ts appearing in favour of one 
particular party.
So what would the court do? Th e most likely option would be for it to apply the 
classic institution of unjust enrichment, which expressly serves to settle cases 
of this kind in which some kind of special legal title (e.g. compensation) can-
not be established. Th e law of unjust enrichment is a general regulation for any 
instance where someone unduly gains a fi nancial advantage, and is thus obliged 
to provide restitution to the party at whose expense they became enriched (§361 
of the old Civil Code; §6:579 of the new Civil Code). A typical case of unjust 
enrichment is mistaken payment, which is when someone pays another party 
to whom they are not actually in debt. According to the submitter of the debt 
relief act, however, “the overpayment defi ned in the above cannot be regarded 
as solutio indebiti [undue payment]” since the lending bank has an outstanding 
claim against the debtor. Here, however, the fundamental question is whether 
the circumstance of the debtor’s debt not yet being due is relevant from the 
point of view of assessing the payment; in other words, the question is what 
happens in the event that the debtor mistakenly fulfi ls his payment obligation 
prior to the maturity of the debt. Is he then entitled to reclaim the amount paid 
in this way, or merely to request that the payment be credited to him as an early 
repayment of his debt? 
Th e latter solution, on which the provision of the act is based, would run counter 
to both the contractual intent of the parties and the essence of a loan contract. 
In a loan contract, the parties agree that the creditor will disburse a specifi ed 
sum to the debtor, which the latter is obliged to repay at a later time; or, to put 
it another way, the loan contract entitles the debtor to use the creditor’s money 
for a stipulated period of time. An unintentional repayment is not a legal action 
which would in any sense overwrite the agreement between the parties; the loan 
contract is still eff ective, and the debtor is still entitled to use the given sum ac-
cordingly. Unless some event has occurred in the meantime leading to termina-
tion of the contract, the creditor cannot refuse to make the mistakenly repaid 
sum available to the debtor once more. Th is situation can only be interpreted as 
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solutio indebiti resulting in unjust enrichment of the creditor, obliging the lat-
ter to refund the given sum to the debtor. It is my conviction that on this basis 
the situation could be resolved in a legally well-grounded, fi nancially correct 
manner. In any event, it is sad how casually the legislator is willing to depart 
from a classic legal solution based on very weak reasoning, even in a case where 
the declared goal and constitutional requirements alike would demand that it 
adopts the most conservative legal position possible.
Amendment of the act of invalidity
Although there is no scope here to present and analyze the debt relief act in de-
tail, it would be a mistake to omit mentioning how this law has amended several 
points of the act of invalidity, itself passed only a few months previously.
One such essential amendment specifi es that the assumption of invalidity of the 
contractual clause enabling unilateral amendment of contracts does not apply to 
clauses applied aft er 27 November 2010 with respect to a specifi c range of forint 
and forex loan contracts (paragraph (9) of §52). One of the key objections to the 
act of invalidity was that in formulating the requirements with respect to con-
tractual clauses enabling the unilateral amendment of contracts, the act com-
pletely disregarded the fact that special prescriptions of the law, changing several 
times over the years, applied to such contractual clauses. Th e law now justifi es 
this amendment precisely by noting that it was at this time that the legal regula-
tions pertaining to these contractual terms were amended, which supports the 
opinion that the changing legal environment cannot be disregarded in applying 
these requirements. 
Th is is also a fundamental change because one of the most signifi cant constitu-
tional objections to the act of invalidity was expressed with respect to just the 
making of this presumption and the resulting reversal of the burden of proof. 
As a consequence of the amendment, it is not the credit institution which must 
initiate a lawsuit in order to protect the contract, but the MNB which is entitled 
to sue the institution if it judges a contractual condition to be unfair. Critics of 
the act of invalidity have objected to the law precisely due to what they see as 
unjustifi ed retroactive redraft ing of the earlier rules, since the legislator’s desired 
goal – even without the injury caused by the act – would be achievable by means 
of a so-called suit in the public interest initiated by the MNB or other entitled 
body. With this legal amendment, even the legislator has now acknowledged that 
this is a genuinely viable route, which in itself confi rms that related constitutional 
concerns were well founded. At the same time, the amendment has resulted in the 
creation of an ambiguous situation whereby diff erent rules apply to contracts fall-
ing within the scope of the amendment and to those which fall outside it, which is 
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to say that diff erent presumptions prevail regarding the same contractual clause 
depending on what kind of contract contains the clause. In this way, the act has 
created a confusing situation that cannot be reconciled with the concept of legal 
certainty. As a consequence of this, proceedings may be launched in connection 
with the same contractual condition based on entirely diff erent rules, which in it-
self carries the risk that diff erent judgements are delivered in diff erent procedures 
regarding the same contractual clause.
Although it does not appear thus in form, in terms of content the provision which 
prohibits banks from raising interest and charges until 30 April 2016 (§45) can like-
wise be regarded as an amendment of the act of invalidity. In proceedings initiated 
on the basis of the act of invalidity, the clause enabling unilateral amendment thus 
proves valid to no avail as the bank is not entitled to assert this right. Th is amend-
ment of the law thus overwrites the valid agreement between the parties, despite the 
fact that the legislator set requirements that are very hard to fulfi l with respect to the 
validity of such an agreement. Th e banks are not entitled to raise interest rates even 
when they conform to the relevant legal requirements, and even if the conditions 
are otherwise in place rendering a raise justifi ed and lawful. With this amendment 
the debt relief act encroaches on the principle of private autonomy, violating the 
freedom of contract and the binding power of contracts that derives from this.
Finally, we draw attention to one more very signifi cant change from the point 
of view of constitutionality. Th e debt relief act states that there is no scope for a 
retrial in suits aimed at overcoming a presumption of unfairness made in relation 
to contractual clauses enabling unilateral amendment (paragraph (11) of §52). A 
retrial is classifi ed as an extraordinary remedy, which – within the strict frame-
work regulated by procedural law – permits a binding judgement to be reviewed 
in light of a given circumstance, unknown at the time the judgement was reached, 
becoming known aft er the event. 
Retrial is an institution of fundamental importance which ensures that a judge-
ment founded on the bearings of a case which do not actually correspond to the 
relevant facts should not remain in force, provided that the omission of the given 
facts was not the result of negligence on the part of the party initiating the retrial. 
A special instance of a retrial occurs when, aft er the judgement is made, the law 
serving as the basis of the judgement is declared void by the Constitutional Court 
due to contravention of the Fundamental Law. In such a case, it is obviously not the 
fault of the litigant that legislation contravening the Fundamental Law was applied 
in the legal action at hand. At such times, a spanner is thrown into the works of state 
justice when it emerges that a law created by the state should not have been applied. 
In instances like this, it is thus especially reasonable that there should be a legal 
remedy available to the aff ected party with which to correct this error.
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Retrial is therefore a fundamental tool ensuring the lawful functioning of justice, 
provided to litigants by practically every legal system operating on the terrain of 
constitutionality. Th is is particularly true of a case of a retrial where the annul-
ment of the applied law enables the legal dispute to be judged anew. Moreover, this 
amendment also runs up against the prohibition on retroactive legislation since it 
deprives the party in a procedure already in progress of the extraordinary remedy 
guaranteed by law; it excludes the parties from a forum of legal remedy which was 
still open to them when the procedure began, and which otherwise remains avail-
able to the parties in all other civil suits. We can see no sensible justifi cation that 
would legitimize this step or refute its arbitrariness. 
We can only gauge the real signifi cance of this legal deprivation, however, if we 
also take into account that the dispute in the lawsuits in question concerns not 
the factual background to the case, but instead a purely legal issue. Th e court is 
examining whether a contractual condition applied by the bank conforms to the 
requirements specifi ed by the law. For this reason, with respect to these suits, the 
option of retrial will arise primarily in the event that the Constitutional Court 
annuls the act of invalidity. Each bank that has initiated legal action has argued 
that the act contravenes the Fundamental Law, and accordingly has requested the 
acting court to suspend the lawsuit and to request the Constitutional Court to 
review the act. Regrettably, a majority of judges on the Metropolitan Court of the 
fi rst instance rejected this request, fi nding that the application of the act was not 
a source of concern. Th is is especially painful because a major portion of the con-
stitutional concerns over the act expressly touched upon fundamental elements 
of constitutionality, namely the prohibition on retroactive legislation, the right 
to due process and the independence of the judiciary. Th ere is the suggestion of 
something fundamentally amiss if a judge is insensitive to these matters, if even 
damage to the independence of the judiciary fails to disturb them. Luckily, there 
were still a few judges opposing the majority opinion who have turned to the Con-
stitutional Court, and hopefully there will be other judges sitting on the Metro-
politan Court of Appeal of the second instance who will proceed in the same way. 
Th e act of invalidity has thus come before the Constitutional Court, while it is 
also possible that lawsuits will reach legally binding conclusions in the mean-
time. In these cases, the option of retrial would arise should the Constitutional 
Court accede to the petitions. Th e amendment of the law is thus explicitly aimed 
at preventing the lawsuits being tried again, or at invalidating judgements in the 
event that the law which serves as their basis is ann ulled. Th is tiny, barely notice-
able amendment is therefore essentially designed to ensure that the extraordinary 
situation introduced by the act should prevail even in the event of the Constitu-
tional Court qualifying it as contravening the Fundamental Law. In other words, 
the debt relief act – in respect of the act of invalidity – eff ectively eliminates the 
possibility of constitutional oversight.
BÁLINT BOTOS66
A HEDGED CARRY TRADE STRATEGY ON THE 
HUNGARIAN, POLISH AND CZECH MARKETS
Bálint Botos
Absract
Th e main goal of this paper is to present, through three East European curren-
cies and the EUR/USD currency-pair, carry trades built on diff erences in the 
interest-rates on the Hungarian forint (HUF), Czech koruna (CZK) and Polish 
złoty (PLN) against the euro (EUR). Th e presented transactions are partly hedged 
with a position of similar amount assumed in another currency-pair, in our case 
the EUR/USD, in order to reduce exchange-rate exposure and thereby risk. Aft er 
presenting the underlying theories and the hedging transaction, we carry out an 
empirical examination of the yield on the strategy we have thus established, and 
then compare this with the yield on standard carry trades. Use of the strategy re-
sulted in abnormally high yields on all three currency-pairs. Th e annual average 
yield was 7.8% in the case of the HUF, 4.8% for the PLN and 4.0% for the CZK, 
each higher than yields on pure carry trades. Th e time spent trading with a carry 
trade strategy based on pairs trading was 41%, 34% and 34%, respectively.
JEL codes: G17, G15, F31
Keywords: carry trade, currency hedge, pairs trading, cointegration, safe haven
INTRODUCTION
In the carry trade transaction, we borrow in a low interest-rate environment and 
then convert the obtained funds to another currency at current exchange rate, 
gaining a profi t by investing the money at a higher rate of interest. By holding the 
position, a continuous interest income can be earned on the diff erence in interest-
rates on the two currencies, i.e. the diff erence between the interest paid and the 
interest received. A constant income can be maintained while the strategy is ap-
plied, even using a signifi cant leverage; however, our exchange rate exposure rep-
resents a continuous risk, as the capital invested at a high rate of interest must be 
changed back at a future spot exchange rate. If this later rate imposes unfavour-
able exchange conditions, we generate a loss. 
Prior to the 2008 crisis, typical carry trade currencies for borrowing included 
the Japanese yen (JPY) or the Swiss franc (CHF), while the New Zealand dollar 
(NZD) and Australian dollar (AUD), similarly to the HUF, were used to generate 
interest income. Th e opportunities inherent in carry trade declined following the 
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crisis, since interest-rates in most countries came close to zero and the interest-
rate diff erentials thus became negligible.
According to theories pertaining to exchange rates, it is likely – or rather normal 
in the long term – that our profi t from the interest margin is reduced to zero when 
changing a currency back, and, taking costs into account as well, it will eventually 
turn into a loss. Th e strategy particularly contradicts the theory of uncovered in-
terest rate parity, which states that two diff erent currencies must off er an identical 
yield, taking interest and exchange rate movements into account. Th e exchange 
rate of the low-interest currency appreciates, thus causing a loss when changing 
back from the higher-interest currency. Contrary to the theory, numerous studies 
have presented empirical investigations confi rming that uncovered interest rate 
parity is unrealistic in practical terms and unsatisfactory in the short term (Burn-
side, Eichenbaum and Rebelo, 2007). 
Choosing the point at which to enter can be a key factor in the success of the strat-
egy.  In the course of their investigation, Christiansen, Ranaldo and Söderlind 
(2010) showed that carry trade strategies entail a signifi cant exposure to equity 
markets, and typically retract to the long-term average of parity in the case of 
major market volatility. 
In a fl oating exchange rate regime, the prevailing exchange rate is a value deter-
mined by market participants based on the performance of the underlying econo-
mies. Th e price level observed in the two countries, any changes in this level, the 
interest rate environment and several other monetary and fi scal factors all play a 
role in the evolution of the exchange rate. In the following, as a foundation for our 
empirical investigation, we will briefl y summarize the most important theories 
pertaining to the formation and development of exchange rates.
Interest rate parity creates a connection between the current exchange rate (spot, 
S), the future exchange rate (forward, F) and interest rates. 
(1)
According to the principle of parity, the ratio between the forward and spot ex-
change rates is equal to the ratio between the interest rates on the two currencies. 
To simplify the formula, the diff erence between the forward and spot exchange 
rates is equal to the diff erence between the two interest rates:
(2)
Under interest rate parity, what we gain on interest rate diff erences we lose on the 




ant to uncovered interest rate parity, our expectation is that the depreciation or 
appreciation of a currency must be off set by the interest rate diff erential. Th is 
means a position in which the currency exposure is not hedged with a forward 
transaction, as happens in a carry trade strategy.
Purchasing power parity describes the relation between current exchange rates 
and infl ation. Th e foundation of the theory was laid by Cassel (1918), and re-ex-
amined by Rogoff  (1996), studies which found that the current exchange rate (S0) 
depreciates by the end of the period (S1) by the quotient between the foreign infl a-
tion rate (IFC) and the domestic infl ation rate (IDC).
(3)
Finally, under the Fisher model, formulated by Irving Fisher (1930), the diff erences 
in interest rates in the two economies must be equal to the diff erences in infl ation. 
According to Fisher, real interest rates observable in economies (the diff erence be-
tween nominal interest rates and expected infl ation) remain stable with the passing 
of time, so that the change in nominal interest rates can be explained by the change 
in infl ationary expectations, and not by the change in real interest rates. Pursuant 
to the model, real interest rates are likewise constant for the diff erent economies. 
Otherwise, certain currencies would be more valuable than others.
(4)
A number of economists have taken issue with the theory, arguing that economic 
cycles, liquidity, risk and other factors can alter real interest rates both in time 
and between countries, as Dornbusch, Fischer and Startz (2001) have suggested, 
for example. 
Th e above theories do not always stand up to empirical investigation. As we have 
already mentioned with respect to the work of Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo 
(2007), or the study of Dornbusch, Fischer and Startz (2001) refuting the Fisher 
model, empirical investigations prove the errors in uncovered interest rate parity 
and the Fisher model. Th e carry trade-based, covered currency position presented 
in the following likewise takes the short-term errors of the above theories as its basis.
Pairs trading
Th e currency trading strategy outlined in the following displays substantial sim-
ilarities with the strategy now widely known as pairs trading, which is typically 
based on trading in stocks and bonds. As we may know from the works of Botos, 
Nagy and Ormos (2013), Elliott, van der Hoek and Malcolm (2005), Andrade, Pietro 
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and Seasholes (2005), and Vidyamurthy (2004), pairs trading is a market-neutral 
statistical arbitrage strategy that takes the convergence of prices as its basis. In pairs 
trading, we form pairs of stocks that show a long-term correlation in movement; 
then, when a short-term, abnormal shift  in prices between the paired stocks occurs, 
we form a zero-sum portfolio by taking out long and short positions of matching 
amounts. Th e method applied in pairs trading, instead of the perfect market of the 
Black-Scholes-Merton model that appeared in the 1970s, is an investment strategy, 
developed by quantitative analysts Gerry Bamberger and Nunzio Tartaglia of Mor-
gan Stanley, which builds on corrections in market mispricing resulting from the 
convergence of prices and their reversion to historical trends. Earlier results show 
that the strategy leads to a signifi cant positive abnormal yield.
Th e similarity of the pairs trading strategy lies in the movement of the basic as-
sets concerned, either together or in opposite directions. Th e combined move-
ments can be exploited to build a portfolio, which carries a lower risk and lower 
standard deviation than that of the market, but a higher yield. A major diff erence 
between equity and currency trading is the rate of interest, which fundamentally 
infl uences the direction of trading of each currency pair, signifying constant in-
come but also an exchange rate risk. In the case of equities, shorting costs and 
the cost of potential leverage result in continuous expenditure, irrespective of the 
direction the position is taken. A similarity can also be observed in terms of mean 
reversion, which is the essence of the pairs trading strategy, and which Chris-
tiansen, Ranaldo and Söderlind (2010) presented when applying the carry trade 
strategy in periods of high volatility. Th e key factors in pursuing both strategies 
are the correct selection of equity or currency pairs, and fi nding the right points 
at which to enter and exit.
Trading strategy
Th e EUR/HUF carry trade with EUR/USD hedging
In the case of the Hungarian currency, decisions on monetary policy fall within 
the authority of the National Bank of Hungary (MNB), which has applied an in-
fl ation-targeting policy since 2001 in order to achieve price stability. Th e central 
bank aims to achieve its publicly announced infl ation target of 3% using a variety 
of tools, the most important being to set interest levels. Th e basic idea is that the 
central bank can help form economic policy and stable, sustainable long-term 
economic growth through predictable monetary policy and stable price levels.
From 2002 onwards, the exchange rate of the forint against the euro moved in a 
fi xed band of +/-15%, which was eventually scrapped in 2008, allowing a freely 
moving currency to evolve. Prior to the crisis, the exchange rate was therefore 
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able to move between HUF 240 and 282; then, immediately before the onset of 
the crisis and following the abolition of the exchange band, the rate dipped below 
HUF 228, before rising to cross the HUF 330 boundary as the crisis took hold. 
Emerging from a long, more than decade-long period within the fi xed band, the 
forint exchange rate converged to the expected average of infl ationary diff erences, 
just as described in pairing theories and in the article by Christiansen et al. (2010). 
Th e central bank’s interest rate policy certainly contributed to the evolution of a 
prolonged crawling exchange rate band by allowing investors to obtain signifi cant 
real interest, and thus driving up demand for the forint. Th is real interest has de-
clined in recent years, but is still noticeable.
Figure 1.
Real interest on the forint
Th e decline in the level of real interest is clearly discernible in the above diagram, 
contradicting Fisher’s theory of stable real interest rates over time. Th e reduction 
in interest occurred in parallel with a change of regime at the MNB in 2012–2013, 
aft er which it became the central bank’s unequivocal goal to create a low interest 
rate environment, with price stability as its primary consideration but with the 
goal of helping the real economy also in mind. At the same time, the interest pre-
mium against the euro did not disappear with the regime change, but continues 
to characterize the currency pair, albeit to a lesser extent.
As a consequence of the crisis, however, investors have increasingly spurned risk, 
withdrawing their capital from developing countries seen as risky, including 
Hungary (Ormos and Joó, 2014). Th is inclination to withdraw has arisen regularly 
over the ensuing years as “turbulence” has appeared in Hungary or the world at 
large. Among pricing anomalies appearing globally, the appreciation of the USD 
and depreciation of other currencies such as the EUR and HUF has typically been 
observed. A strong negative correlation has characterized these periods as far as 
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the EUR/USD and EUR/HUF are concerned. Th e movement of the two currency 
pairs can be observed in Fig. 2.
Figure 2.
Relative movement of EUR/HUF and EUR/USD exchange rates
We can describe the typically opposing movement of these exchange rates with 
values that correlate. Th e 180-day moving average correlated value of closing daily 
exchange rates and the value of 360-day correlations seen in various years, which 
varied between +0.13 and -0.84, with an average of -0.35, can be seen in Fig. 3.
Figure 3.
Correlation of EUR/HUF and EUR/USD exchange rates
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As illustrated in the above diagram, or as discernible from earlier described data, 
there is a strong negative correlation, whereby the EUR/HUF and EUR/USD ex-
change rates typically move in opposite directions in response to various market 
events. Th is correlation accurately characterizes the direction of shift s in daily 
exchange rates, but does not give an unequivocal answer regarding the long-term 
trend, which – as described by Botos, Nagy and Ormos (2013), Erdős and Ormos 
(2012a and 2012b) and other studies dealing with the correlation, such as Alex-
ander and Dimitriu (2002) – can be better characterized through cointegration. 
We ran a cointegration test with the EUR/HUF and an inverse EUR/USD pair, 
ruling out the null hypothesis – which would claim no cointegration relationship 
between the pairs – with the following results.
Table 1.
Cointegration test of exchange rates of currency pairs
EUR/HUF EUR/CZK EUR/PLN
EUR/USD 2.7346 2.229 2.992
EUR/HUF 0 2.324 3.103
EUR/CZK 0 0 2.203
For the analysis, we applied an augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. From the ta-
ble it can be seen that the results of the test statistics generally exceed the thresh-
old value of 2 belonging to the 90% signifi cance level, so that the null hypothesis 
is rejected with 90% confi dence.
Both the correlation-based and cointegration tests show a negative relationship 
between the exchange rate movements of the EUR/HUF and EUR/USD currency 
pairs. Th is connection cannot derive from the shared exposure to the euro, since 
in both cases this is the borrowing foundation, and consequently would induce 
a signifi cant positive, rather than a negative connection. Th e two currency pairs 
counteract each other’s price movements, so that they might prove suitable for 
building hedging positions for the examined period. Th is could be achieved by 
borrowing two units in EUR, then buying one unit in HUF and one unit in USD. 
Th e portfolio thus created would off er the high interest on the forint typical be-
tween 2007 and 2014, but the EUR/USD side would partly compensate for the risk 
deriving from the exchange rate exposure. In the examined period, the EUR/USD 
paid interest in a variable direction, with the level of net interest over the entire 
period at -0.42% (Fig. 15, interest rate diff erentials). We present the portfolio con-
taining the EUR/USD and EUR/HUF currency pairs with a solid grey line in Fig. 
4. Th e portfolio is represented by the multiple of the currency pairs.
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Figure 4.
EUR/HUF and EUR/USD currency multiple and EUR/HUF exchange rate
Examining the currency multiple-curve, we can draw two important conclusions. 
On the one hand, the steepness of the curve is less pronounced than the steepness 
of the EUR/HUF exchange rate curve. Taking the trend as a long-term average, 
a depreciation of 15.7% could be observed over the entire period in the case of 
the multiple, while this fi gure was 23.5% in the case of the EUR/HUF currency 
pair. Th is means an annual depreciation of 1.9% and 2.79%, respectively. Overall, 
this means that in shorting the EUR/HUF and EUR/USD, the movement of the 
exchange rate over the entire period was smaller, and thus our resulting exchange 
rate loss was also less . Th is is one of the most important results of this strategy: we 
obtained a position with a lower risk than a pure short position. Th e price of this 
position is the shorting cost of the EUR/USD currency pair, which is marginal, 
but negative over the examined period (Fig. 15, EUR/USD interest rate diff eren-
tials). Comparing the plain EUR/HUF chart to the portfolio, the 2.8% price shift  
(exchange rate loss) – also taking into account the 4.71% interest yield – resulted 
in a smaller total yield (1.91%) than the 1.9% exchange rate loss and 4.29% interest 
gain on the portfolio. Th e profi t on a portfolio formed in this way is an annual 
2.39%, taking the trend into account.
Th e other conclusion that can be drawn from Fig. 4 is that the standard devia-
tion of the multiple is more signifi cant (24.7 forints) than that of the simple EUR/
USD exchange rate (20.5 forints). Th is can be regarded as an unfavourable feature 
for a speculator employing a long-term carry trade strategy, but as the study of 
Christiansen et al. (2010) suggests, an important aspect of applying the strategy 
is determining the entry and exit points, since the exchange rate continues to be 
characterized by the exposure of the currency pairs to general market volatility. 
Determining the correct entry and exit points, on the other hand, becomes easier 
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the more common and frequent the extreme values are. Th is part of the strategy 
is likewise manageable with the entry and exit points described for pairs trading 
strategies. Th e trading strategy presented in the study by Gatev, Goetzmann and 
Rouwenhorst (2003) can be applied here too with modifi ed parameters, whereby 
in the case of an entry occurring at a Z-score of 1 above the mean and a Z-score 
of -1 below the mean, we spend an appropriate time in the position that results in 
an interest income and reduces the risk of exchange rate movements, or may even 
make an exchange rate gain. Th e above strategy is illustrated in Fig. 5.
Figure 5.
Th e exchange rate curve of the portfolio formed from EUR/HUF
and EUR/USD positions and the trading levels
A similarly suitable means of presenting the strategy is to depict daily exchange 
rates within a system of coordinates. We obtain a set of points where each point 
signifi es a EUR/HUF and EUR/USD exchange rate. Th e dimensions of the set of 
points show the entire range of movement of the currency pair over the exam-
ined period. Th e dotted lines featured on the diagram are isoprofi t lines, shift ing 
along which does not change the value of the multiple, so that no yield or loss is 
generated. Th e favourable entry position is found in the north-eastern corner of 
the diagram, from where the multiple can be expected to move towards the ori-
gin (mean reversion), or to stagnate along the isoprofi t line and simultaneously 
generate interest. It is clearly apparent that the set is fl atter at the isoprofi t curves. 
Consequently, the truly extreme multiple values are to be found in the eastern 
part of the set, from where the reversion generates an exchange rate gain.
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Figure 6.
Daily exchange rates between 1 January 2007 and 31 August 2014
Th e above description is designed to help understand the train of thought and to 
illustrate the calculations – methods we also apply in the case of the other two 
currency pairs, the EUR/CZK and EUR/PLN.
Figure 7.
Relative movement of EUR/PLN and EUR/USD exchange rates
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Examination of EUR/PLN and EUR/USD 
Similarly to the objectives of the Hungarian and Czech central banks, Poland’s 
national bank regards the preservation of price stability and infl ation targeting 
as its primary tasks. Since 2004, its goal has been to maintain infl ation within a 
band +/- 1 percentage point of 2.5%. In order to attain its goal, the central bank has 
operated with interest rates of between 6.8% and 2.7%, with an interest premium 
against the EUR between -0.06% and 4.7%, average 2.59%.
Th e negative correlation observed in the case of the EUR/USD and EUR/HUF 
pairs can also be perceived with the EUR/USD and EUR/PLN pairs. Th e relative 
movement of the currency pairs is illustrated in Fig. 7. Similarly as we experienced 
with the HUF, the two currency pairs respond to changes in international mood 
with movements in opposing directions: in a period of decreasing inclination to 
take risks, the EUR/USD exchange rate declines, while the EUR/PLN exchange 
rate rises. Th ese opposing movements are confi rmed by the correlation and coin-
tegration tests carried out on the EUR/USD and EUR/PLN exchange rates.
Figure 8.
Correlation of EUR/PLN and EUR/USD exchange rates
In Fig. 8 we can see that the annual correlation of the EUR/USD and EUR/PLN 
exchange rate pairs was between -0.92 and 0.13, with an average of -0.42. Th e 
average 180-day correlation over this period was -0.34. A cointegration test of the 
pair shows a similar result, whereby the two exchange rates (EUR/PLN inverse) 
were characterized by the cointegration value shown in Table 1. Accordingly, we 
also prepare our portfolio for the PLN based on borrowing in EUR and gaining 
interest on investing in USD and PLN, for which the exchange rate movements 
are shown in Fig. 9
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Figure 9.
EUR/PLN and EUR/USD currency multiple, and EUR/PLN exchange rate
Similarly to the other two exchange rate pairs presented in our study, and com-
pared to the exchange rate built purely on shorting EUR/PLN, the steepness of 
the entire EUR/PLN and EUR/USD portfolio declined from 15% to 7.5% over the 
examined period, which is favourable from the point of view of the carry trade. 
Th is means an annual average depreciation of 1.84% and 0.95%, respectively. Both 
fi gures are lower than the interest that can be gained, but the profi t is greater in 
the case of the portfolio, and so it is this that dominates the pure carry trade strat-
egy. For the portfolio assembled in this way, we apply the strategy known from 
pairs trading, for which the entry and exit points are illustrated in Fig.  10.
Figure 10.
Th e exchange rate curve of the portfolio formed from EUR/PLN and EUR/
USD positions, and the entry and exit levels
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Examination of the EUR/CZK and EUR/USD currency pairs
Th e primary task of the Czech National Bank, similarly to the other two central 
banks discussed here, is to maintain price stability and to aid the government’s 
economic policy. Th e infl ation target between 2006 and 2009 was 3%, decreasing 
to 2% from 2009, until entry to the euro zone. Th e 3-month Pribor reference rate 
moved between 4.25% and 0.35%, with an average of 1.76%; on average this falls 
0.05% short of the 3-month Euribor rate. Th e Czech koruna is the only one of the 
examined three currencies to yield lower interest than the euro, albeit minimally.
A negative correlation characterizes the EUR/CZK compared to the EUR/USD 
exchange rate, similarly to the exchange rate movements of the EUR/HUF, EUR/
PLN and EUR/USD. Th ese movements take place in the vicinity of “turbulence” 
in the global economy, at which times the EUR/USD exchange rate declines and 
the EUR/CZK exchange rate rises. Th e relative exchange rate movements can be 
seen in Fig. 11. 
Figure 11.
Relative movement of EUR/CZK and EUR/USD exchange rates
Th e exchange rate movements generally occurred in opposite directions, so that 
the negative correlation observed in the case of the EUR/HUF and EUR/PLN is 
also typical here. Th e 180-day correlation between the two exchange rates was 
between -0.89 and 0.54, with an average of -0.38, while the scale of the annual 
correlation ranged between -0.81 and 0.43, with an average of -0.43. Th e 180 and 
360-day correlations can be seen in the following Fig. 12.
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Figure 12.
Correlation of EUR/CZK and EUR/USD exchange rates
Th e result of the signifi cant negative correlation is that the movement of the port-
folio is more favourable from the trading point of view, and the trend of the cur-
rency multiple-curve fl atter than the EUR/CZK trend, as illustrated in Fig. 13. 
Th e portfolio, in the event of shorting the two currency pairs contained therein, 
appreciated by 8.1% over the entire period, while this fi gure for the EUR/CZK cur-
rency pair was a mere 2.2%. Th is means an annual appreciation (CZK strength-
ening) of 1% and 0.28%, respectively, both fi gures higher than the interest loss 
suff ered.
Figure 13.
EUR/CZK and EUR/USD multiple and EUR/CZK exchange rate
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Th e standard deviation of the EUR/USD and EUR/CZK portfolio also grew here 
compared to the exchange rate, changing from 1.24 to 2.34, which is negative from 
the point of view of the pure carry trade, but positive in the case of a pairs trading 
strategy. Th e nature of the strategy to use exchange rate movements results in 
several entry points, greater exchange rate movements and greater yield. Th e 
lower and upper band illustrating trading levels, as projected onto the above 
multiple-curve, can be seen in Fig. 14.
Figure 14.
Exchange rate curve of the portfolio
formed from EUR/CZK and EUR/USD positions, and the entry and exit levels
Empirical investigation
Data
During the investigation, we analysed daily closing currency exchange rates be-
tween 1 January 2007 and 31 August 2014. We downloaded the exchange rates 
from oanda.com on 10 September 2014. Th e examined currencies were as fol-
lows: American dollar (USD), euro (EUR), Hungarian forint (HUF), Polish złoty 
(PLN), and Czech koruna (CZK). When selecting the currencies it was necessary 
that each should yield higher interest compared to the euro with respect to the pe-
riod 2007–2014, enabling the use of the carry trade. We downloaded the values of 
the 3-month Libor, Euribor, Bubor, Wibor and Pribor reference rates pertaining 
to the currencies from the websites of the respective countries’ national banks, 
and calculated with average monthly interest. Th e interest rate diff erentials of the 
currency pairs are shown in Fig. 15. Of the four currency pairs presented, only the 
EUR/USD currency pair used for hedging had a negative average interest rate dif-
ferential, at -0.45%. Th e EUR/CZK showed a zero interest result, while the EUR/
PLN showed a positive yield of 2.6% and the EUR/HUF a positive yield of 4.71%.
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Figure 15.
Interest rate diff erentials of currency pairs
Strategic parameters
We have based the trading of currency pairs on the aforementioned study by Ga-
tev et al. (2003), forming the portfolio using the algorithm described and further 
developed by Botos, Nagy and Ormos (2013). 
Trading consists of two parts:
 • Selection of the pairs used in the portfolio. In our case, these are the three 
main currencies of Eastern Europe and the EUR/USD pair. Th e selection was 
made on a regional basis and not sorted according to cointegration, although 
we did examine the correlations and cointegration of the selected currencies, 
as already presented above.
 • Determination and application of the trading strategy, which we present in 
the following section.
Using the currency pairs presented under the preceding heading, we will attempt 
to trade at a profi t.
As the next step in further developing the strategy, we calculate the Z(i) values of 
the currency pairs and the EUR/USD multiple, estimate the Z(i), i  {1, 2, . . . , n} 




With the help of the Z(i)t  values, we determine the locations of the position’s open-
ing and closing;
 • If in the case of the pair i. at the time t. Z(i)t  >1, then according to Caldeira 
(2013) we open a position, taking out a short for the St(i,1) currency pair, and a 
similarly short position for the St(i,2) currency pair.
 • If in the case of the pair  i. at the time t. Z(i)t  <–1, then we do not open a posi-
tion. Currencies then are traded exclusively according to the carry trade, in 
the direction of the currency yielding high interest. Determining the entry 
and exit triggers is likewise a key question. In the specialist literature (Gatev, 
Caldeira, etc), a widespread entry trigger is the Z-score of 2, and the exit value 
either a complete reversion to the mean or a Z-score of 0.5. In order to spend 
as much time in the position as possible, we modifi ed this to respective Z-
scores of 1 and –1.
 • If in the case of the pair i. at the time t. –1>Z(i)t , then we close the position.
 • In the case of currency pairs, we do not apply a stop-loss order. Trading 
launched from an extreme position and the constant interest generate a 
continuous yield, and an exit may only occur when the -1 Z-score is crossed.
 • Likewise we do not apply a time limit, as our goal is to hold the position for as 
long as possible.
We compare the yield on the currency positions and portfolio managed in this 
way with the yield on the pure carry trade.
Results
In our study we aim to compare the results of three portfolios assembled using 
three East European currencies and the EUR/USD pair with the results of a pure 
carry trade strategy applied to the three currencies.
Carry trade on the HUF, PLN, CZK currencies
In carrying out a vanilla carry trade with an entry of 1 January 2007 and exit on 
31 August 2014, we were able to achieve the following results.
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Table 2.
Carry trade yields on the EUR/HUF, EUR/PLN and EUR/CZK currency pairs
Exchange rate 
eff ect Interest eff ect Total yield Annual yield
EUR/HUF 0.798 1.435 14.1% 1.7%
EUR/PLN 0.905 1.219 10.4% 1.3%
EUR/CZK 0.990 0.996 -1.3% -0.2%
Th e above data clearly refl ect the signifi cant real interest on the HUF, the moder-
ate real interest on the PLN, and the minimal real interest on the CZK, which is 
also apparent in the interest rate diff erentials on the EUR/HUF, EUR/PLN and 
EUR/CZK currency pairs. In the case of all the currency pairs, we experienced 
negative exchange rate movements (minimal in the case of the CZK), which sup-
port pairs trading theories: the high interest-rate diff erential of the EUR/HUF 
was accompanied by signifi cant depreciation, the medium interest rate diff eren-
tial of the PLN by a similar degree of depreciation, and the interest surplus of the 
CZK by an opposing but almost zero depreciation.
Carry trade on a portfolio made up of EUR/USD and local currencies
following a pairs trading strategy
In the manner presented earlier, by combining the advantage of currency trading, 
i.e. the interest gains, with the benefi ts of pairs trading, namely the determining 
of the right times for trading, we employed a portfolio and trading method which 
substantially increased the yield on the above-mentioned, purely carry trade-
based trading. Besides the high yield, the risks in trading decreased due to brief 
trading times and lower standard deviation.
We compared yield curves to benchmark carry trade yield curves. A signifi cantly 
lower maximum drawdown was observable, signifying decreasing risk. In the 
case of the HUF portfolio, the maximum  drawdown of the carry trade was 23.5%, 
while this fi gure was only 9.5% for the currency pairs trading portfolio. Th e two 
yield curves can be seen in Fig. 16.
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Figure 16.
EUR/HUF and EUR/USD portfolio yield curves
We obtained the above yield and risk by using two-time leverage. Two-time le-
verage applied to a pure carry trade strategy would cause such a great oscillation 
in the portfolio that the entire capital would be put at risk. For the portfolio, 
however, we can apply fi vefold or even more leverage, which, due to entering at an 
extreme value and the continuous fl ow of interest, does not cause oscillation on 
the scale seen in the base strategy.
In the case of the HUF portfolio, we spent 41.6% of the time in trading, while for 
the remainder of the time we had no market exposure and hence no risk; accord-
ingly, we did not calculate a yield and the capital remained available.
Similar results can be observed in the case of the portfolio containing the EUR/
PLN and EUR/USD pairs. Both in yield and in maximum drawdown, the portfo-
lio provides more favourable results than a pure carry trade strategy. A return on 
portfolio of 37% could be observed for the entire period, compared to 10.5% on the 
carry trade, combined with a respective 10.4% and 33.3% maximum drawdown. 
Th e yield increased threefold, with maximum drawdown a third of this.
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Figure 17.
EUR/PLN and EUR/USD portfolio yield curves
In the case of the PLN portfolio, we spent 34% of the time in the position, while for 
the remainder of the time we had no risk and posted no yield. 
Th e yield curve for the third portfolio, comprising the EUR/CZK and EUR/USD 
currency pairs, is shown in Fig. 18. Th e EUR/CZK represents the exception among 
the three examined currency pairs. Although showing a high negative correlation 
with the EUR/USD currency pair, it is not suitable for the carry trade given that the 
CZK has a lower rate of interest than that of the EUR. Over a seven-year average, the 
interest rate diff erential hovered around zero. For pairs trading, however, the sig-
nifi cant opposing movement could make the pair interesting, and so we examined 
its properties. We obtained similar results to those obtained for the portfolios using 
the HUF and PLN currencies. Th e yield received for the entire examined period was 
30.5%, signifi cantly exceeding the -1.3% yield received on the carry trade.
Figure 18.
EUR/CZK and EUR/USD portfolio yield curves
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With respect to the maximum drawdown, the CZK carry trade yield curve 
shows a result similar to the two other currencies, with a maximum drawdown 
of 21.5%. Th e pairs trading strategy shows a signifi cantly lower maximum draw-
down here as well, at 7.7%. Th e time spent in trading was similar to that of the 
PLN portfolio, at 34.3%.
Summarizing the yields on the above currency pairs, we can display the following 
results.
Table 3.
Yields on the presented carry trade strategy
for the EUR/HUF, EUR/PLN and EUR/CZK currency pairs
Time spent in 
trading Total yield Annual yield
EUR/HUF 41.6% 59.0% 7.8%
EUR/PLN 34.0% 37.1% 4.8%
EUR/CZK 34.3% 30.2% 4.0%
CONCLUSIONS
In our study, we presented the interest rate diff erentials of the three main curren-
cies of the CEE region compared to the euro, and the signifi cant real interest rate 
of the HUF. During the crisis, this substantial interest premium was paired with 
exchange rate movements on a signifi cant scale. Th ere is a perceptible connection 
between the 7-year trend of all three currencies concerned and economic theories 
of parity. In order to illustrate this, we presented the carry trade yields over the 
examined period, which resulted in minimal profi t. Annual yields in the case of 
the EUR/HUF, EUR/PLN and EUR/CZK were a respective 1.7%, 1.3% and -0.2%. 
Even so, compared to the -0.2% yield on the CZK, the 1.7% yield on the HUF 
signifi es a signifi cant and lasting interest premium, contradicting Fisher’s model.
We established a trading system, which exploits the negative correlations between 
the EUR/USD and the three EUR/local currency pairs. Th is strategy is built on 
the pairs trading method and helps determine the trading points occurring with-
in an extreme range. Using the above trading strategy, we attained signifi cant 
positive abnormal returns, generating annual yields of 7.8%, 4.8% and 4.0% on 
portfolios containing the HUF, PLN and CZK currencies, respectively, far out-
stripping the yields attainable on the pure carry trade.
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When calculating the results, the yields deriving from shift s in exchange rates 
are signifi cant, helped only to a small extent by the rate of interest. Th e carry 
trade applied to currency pairs thus falls somewhere between a straightforward 
carry trade and pairs trading. During a carry trade, parity theories hold that the 
movement of the exchange rate works against profi tability in the long term; in 
the case of pairs trading, however, we are eff ectively obliged to trade at a negative 
rate of interest due to continuous shorting and leverage costs, so that (contrary 
to the carry trade) our goal is to reduce the time spent trading. With this goal in 
mind, we have modifi ed the entry points compared to the study by Botos, Nagy 
and Ormos (2013).
A typical everyday aspect of the above strategy in the CEE region has been for-
eign currency borrowing, which has seen the population run up debts mostly 
through EUR, CHF and JPY loans, the latter two currencies typically featuring 
on the credit side of the carry trade strategy prior to the crisis. Aft er borrowing, 
as described by Christiansen et al. (2010), the currency would converge on the 
long-term average during periods of high volatility experienced under the crisis. 
Th e convergence was not total, since in the case of the HUF annual interest of 
1.7% remained in the exchange rate looking at the period beginning from 2007. 
“Everyday carry-traders” experienced this signifi cant exchange rate movement in 
the loss of their homes and cars. However, assuming that interest on bank loans 
follows market rates, then even in this convergence period a carry trade specula-
tor would not emerge from a currency transaction with a loss. Th e problem was 
typically caused by the investment side: everyday carry-traders typically invested 
borrowed credit in rapidly amortizing investments that do not generate a yield 
(cars), or in low-liquidity assets that are sensitive to changing economic cycles 
(real estate, investments). If these assets had brought them close to the examined 
3-month Bubor rate, then everyday carry-traders would still be in profi table trad-
ing to this day. If these everyday carry-traders had taken up their carry trade posi-
tions within the extreme range as described above, then the value of the portfolio 
would typically exceed the hedging point.
It is important to note that the strategy also draws attention to the evolution of ex-
treme exchange rate levels, which may help currency speculators and even com-
panies engaged in the international trade of goods. A combined examination of 
the EUR/USD and the local currency may point out and isolate the domestic or 
international causes of exchange rate shift s. Th e currency market view as seen in 
the pairs trading strategy, and even simply the hedging of the exchange rate at the 
local maximums, is a practice missing among small domestic enterprises, and yet 
it could have a considerable bearing on profi tability.
We have not examined the results of the carry trade and the examined strategy 
with regard to the CHF and JPY, even though it was to these two currencies that 
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the Hungarian population had the greatest exposure aft er the EUR. Another 
interesting aspect of the CHF was its pegging to the EUR in 2011, while it may 
also be interesting to examine the extent to which the regional currencies can be 
traded against each other, particularly the low-interest CZK against the other two 
examined currencies. As can be seen from the cointegration matrix, the synchro-
nous movement of these currencies is considerable. 
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